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ABSTRACT 
Haramia, Chelsea Mae (Ph.D., Philosophy) 
Roles and Responsibilities: Creating Moral Subjects 
Thesis directed by Professor David Boonin 
 
This work centers on the non-identity problem, but the implications of my view extend 
well beyond standard non-identity cases. The non-identity problem arises when moral agents are 
in a position to determine both the welfare and existence of the moral subject(s) in question. If we 
assume a very commonsense account of harm—the comparative account—then causing a subject 
to exist entails, under some circumstances, that low welfare is not actually a matter of moral 
concern. This seems intuitively incorrect. The non-identity problem challenges what seem to be 
very clear intuitions about wrongness and harm, and it uncovers distinct moral considerations. A 
solution must reconcile our intuitions of harm with a justified account of that harm. My approach 
allows this through appeal to specific responsibilities that arise for agents who take on certain 
roles. My aim here is to provide a thorough analysis of this kind of role-based approach to creation 
cases, and to provide a means by which we can uncover harm in non-identity cases. This solution 
is useful not because I propose a principle that delineates precisely when a given act of creation is 
wrong, but because the feature of non-identity cases that generated the problem was our supposed 
inability to appeal to the comparative account of harm when assessing wrongness; and my view 
allows for an appeal to the comparative account of harm. The real problem with non-identity cases 
is not simply that we cannot tell the agent that she has done something wrong. It is that we were 
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blocked from even analyzing these cases properly in the first place. I have uncovered a means by 
which we can usefully analyze creation cases, but its use does not end there. If these principles are 
true, they not only provide us with a sound approach to the non-identity problem, they also provide 
us with moral features to which we can appeal whenever we assess our roles and respective 
responsibilities to children, future generations, society, species, and to the human race, regardless 
of the particulars of existence.
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CHAPTER 1: THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a parent decides to feed his child paint chips. This child eats the paint and then 
suffers brain damage as a result. To make matters worse, let’s say this parent fed his child the paint 
chips fully aware that it would cause brain damage and with the express intention that his child 
suffer brain damage. Without a doubt, this person has failed in his role as parent. He has 
unjustifiably harmed his child to whom he bears significant responsibilities. But not all cases of 
parental failings are so easily cashed out. What if that parent decided to conceive with his partner 
a child with mental functioning equal to that of the paint-chip child? On certain accounts, this isn’t 
even harmful, for reasons I will outline shortly. It turns out that creation cases bring with them 
unique moral considerations—not only for parents, but also for all moral agents who create moral 
subjects. Creation cases like these often lead to the non-identity problem.  
This work centers on the non-identity problem, but the implications of my view extend 
well beyond standard non-identity cases. The non-identity problem arises when moral agents are 
in a position to determine both the welfare and existence of the moral subject(s) in question.1 If we 
assume a very commonsense account of harm—the comparative account—then causing a subject 
to exist entails, under some circumstances, that low welfare is not actually a matter of moral 
concern. This seems intuitively incorrect. The non-identity problem challenges what seem to be 
 
1 I will be using as a basis the formulation of the non-identity problem outlined by Derek Parfit. See Parfit 1984: 351-
379. 
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very clear intuitions about wrongness and harm, and it uncovers distinct moral considerations. A 
solution must reconcile our intuitions of harm with a justified account of that harm. My approach 
allows this through appeal to specific responsibilities that arise for agents who take on certain 
roles. My aim here is to provide a thorough analysis of this kind of role-based approach to creation 
cases, and to provide a means by which we can uncover harm in non-identity cases. This analysis 
has direct implications not only for abstract ethical dilemmas, but also for practical issues, such as 
environmental policy, population ethics, bioethics, animal ethics, and species ethics. 
1.2 THE PROBLEM: TWO VERSIONS  
The non-identity problem is often cast in terms of either same number cases or different 
number cases.2 While I maintain a similar distinction, my focus in not on numbers per se. Rather, 
I wish to focus on distinguishing cases of a narrower, personal nature from cases of a broader, 
social nature.  
Version 1 – Simple Procreation Cases 
Simple cases of the non-identity problem classically involve questions of which individual 
children to have in the near future. I focus on this version first, and I then outline the second version 
involving large-scale social concerns.  These two versions carry importantly different implications 
– which I will uncover as this work progresses—but all non-identity cases have certain of the same 
features. While the non-identity problem comes in various forms, crucial to the formation of a non-
 
2 This is part of Parfit’s original formulation of the problem. See Parfit 1984. 
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identity problem is that an act produce two specific effects.3 That is, the case in question must have 
the following characteristics, which I call “Identity Determination” and “Welfare Determination:” 
ID: The act in question must determine the identity of the subject in question. 
WD: The act in question must predictably affect the overall welfare of the subject 
in question. 
To illustrate how these determinations take place, consider the following simple 
procreation case:  
Sarah: Sarah decides to become a mother. She goes to the doctor and the doctor 
tells her two things. One: if she conceives immediately, she will give birth to a child 
with a serious birth defect—call this child ‘Trig.’ The particular defect does not 
matter, although one should keep in mind that it is serious, but not so severe that it 
significantly shortens the child’s life or makes the child’s life not worth living. 
Two: if she waits and takes a tiny pill every day for two months, she will conceive 
and give birth to a perfectly healthy child—call him ‘Track.’ So, her options are (1) 
to conceive Trig now with a defect and lower welfare than the child she otherwise 
would have conceived or (2) conceive perfectly healthy Track later with higher 
welfare (but with the added inconvenience of repeatedly having to take a pill). She 
chooses option (1). 
The act of not taking the pill and conceiving immediately determines that a certain egg and 
sperm unite creating not only a specific identity but also the defect that affects the welfare of the 
person with that particular identity. Given basic facts about reproduction, taking the pill and 
waiting to conceive determines that a different person with a different identity comes into 
 
3 This outlining of the problems comes directly from an earlier article. See Haramia 2012: 356. 
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existence, because waiting ensures that a different sperm fertilizes a different egg. Thus, the 
genetic identity of Sarah’s child is time-dependent. Taking the pill also determines that the person 
who comes into existence will have a higher level of welfare that comes from not having the 
serious defect. So, in the case above, the mother must choose between two courses of action, each 
of which determines the identity and affects the welfare of her future child. 
Since Sarah decides that taking the pills is too inconvenient, she conceives immediately 
and conceives a child with a serious defect. She could simply have waited and very soon given 
birth to a healthy child, but she does not. Does she then do something wrong? Many think that she 
does do something wrong by knowingly and willingly conceiving a child with a defect when she 
could have conceived a healthy child. And we tend to think that she then harms her child. But 
closer examination undercuts this intuition, and out of this arises the problem with non-identity 
cases. 
If you intuit that Sarah harms her child, it is likely that you are also envisioning a very 
useful and common account of harm—the aforementioned comparative account. The simple 
explanation of this account is the following. When given a case with a moral agent and a moral 
subject, we determine whether harm occurs by comparing the current state of the subject with the 
state the subject would have been in had the agent not performed the act in question (or performed 
it, as the case may be). If the current state leaves the subject worse off that the subject otherwise 
would have been, then the subject has been harmed. This account can be stated as follows: 
Comparative Account: P’s act is harmful if P’s act causes Q to be worse off than Q 
otherwise would have been. 
So, if I steal one thousand dollars from you, I have harmed you under the comparative 
account because you are one thousand dollars poorer and pro tanto worse off than if I had not 
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stolen the money.  Notice that this also entails that I can harm you if, say, I am an employer, and I 
hire someone else to fill a position for which you applied. While both of the above actions are 
harmful, stealing from you seems clearly wrong while opting to employ another candidate seems 
(prima facie) perfectly permissible. That is because, on this account, ‘harm’ is not a morally loaded 
term. The comparison is a metric by which we may determine whether harm has occurred, but it 
is a further question whether any case of harm is also morally wrong. So even in Sarah’s case, 
pinpointing harm is only the first step, and determining whether the harm is unjustified (and 
thereby wrong) is an important second step. 
Yet, in the Sarah case, neither Trig nor Track is made worse off no matter Sarah’s choice. 
Despite appearances, if Sarah conceives Trig, Sarah does not thereby harm Trig.  Trig has a life 
worth living, and, importantly, Trig has not been made worse off than he otherwise would have 
been. The alternative is that he does not exist at all. Assuming existence is not positively worse for 
Trig, Sarah does not harm Trig by conceiving him instead of Track. In fact, she may benefit him 
because his life is worth living. And since Track does not exist, it is impossible that he be harmed 
in this scenario. Furthermore, Sarah avoids the hassle of taking a pill for two months. Thus, under 
the comparative account of harm, no one is harmed, and Sarah and Trig may actually be benefited. 
While this comparative sense is not the only sense of harm that philosophers have posited, it is the 
sense on which Parfit relies to generate the problem. Furthermore, given that this account of harm 
is so useful in more common cases, I claim that a virtue of a good approach to the non-identity 
problem will be its ability to retain this commonsense, comparative account of harm.  
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Version 2 – Future Generations Cases 
The simple procreation case I have presented above qualifies as what Parfit calls “Same 
Number” cases.4 Whether Sarah takes the pill and waits to conceive or conceives immediately, the 
same number of persons will come into existence, namely, one child. Yet, what makes simple 
cases simple for our purposes is not the fact that only one person will come into existence as a 
result of the choice at hand, rather, what matters is that the consequences are immediate and the 
choices are personal. So a couple’s choice about whether to have two or three children also falls 
under the category of simple procreation cases, even though a different number of children will 
exist in either scenario. This simple version is not the only kind of non-identity case. Personal, 
procreation cases differ from other, more social and sweeping cases that raise the non-identity 
problem. These are commonly cases wherein a different or unknown number of persons will come 
into existence in the further future—depending on the decision made—but, importantly, theses 
cases usually require that we consider our roles as members of society or as steward to those who 
come after us. Cases that question how we should act toward the environment and future 
generations often fall into this category. Consider the following case:5 
Business-as-usual: We pollute the environment by intentionally not recycling, 
wantonly increasing carbon emissions, ruining the soil that grows our food, and 
using up our natural resources without regard for the future. As we do this, we find 
that our lives are full of ease, convenience, and plentitude for several generations. 
It is also the case that the union of each egg and sperm that determine who exists in 
a given generation is very time-dependent. Such sweeping behavior will cause 
 
4 Parfit 1984: 356. 
5 Parfit 1984: 361-364. I present here a significantly modified case involving the salient concerns that arise from 
Parfit’s discussion of Depletion versus Conservation cases. 
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individuals to meet and couple at different times, creating different people than they 
would have otherwise. Thus, our acts are such that different people come into 
existence than would have existed had we not engaged in these practices. 
Unsurprisingly, after several generations, the welfare of the existing people drops 
precipitously because we have damaged the earth, radically altered the climate, and 
run out of many important resources. Yet, these future people have lives that are 
still worth living. Importantly, their lives are worse than the lives would have been 
for the other people we would have had a hand in creating had we not engaged in 
the above practices. 
We probably feel that it is wrong to treat the environment and our resources in such a way 
at least in part because we feel that it is wrong to make things worse for future generations, 
especially if we are knowingly making things worse for them simply for the sake of added creature 
comforts today. However, if we take into account non-identity considerations when analyzing the 
above case, it turns out that we do not make the members of those future generations who come 
into existence worse off by our pollution and resource use. If, on the one hand, those who come 
into existence in a world stripped of resources still have lives worth living, then this scenario is 
not positively worse for them. On the other hand, those who would have been better off than the 
future generations who actually come into existence do not in fact come into existence and 
therefore cannot be harmed, because we plainly cannot harm those who do not and will not exist. 
So, since we do not make anyone worse off, no one is harmed. If no one is harmed in either the 
Sarah case or the Business-as-usual case, where is the wrong? 
Without an adequate account of harm, it is difficult to make claims of wrongness. We are 
then left with what seems to be no harm, no wrongdoing, and arguable benefits; therefore, we 
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should have no qualms with Sarah’s decision to conceive immediately, or with the decisions made 
in the Business-as-usual case. But many of us still feel as if something has gone morally wrong, 
hence the problem with non-identity. We intuit a wrong, yet, due to the particulars of the case, we 
have no account of that wrong. This is not to say that there exists no account of the wrong, but the 
burden of proof is on those of us who intuit wrongness to say how exactly that wrong arises. 
The basis for this problem with non-identity can be encapsulated in the following 
principles: 
(A) If P’s act harms Q, then P’s act makes Q worse off than Q otherwise would 
have been. 
(B) If P’s act does not harm Q, then P’s act does not wrong Q. 
(C) If P’s act does not wrong Q, then P’s act is not wrong. 
These seemingly reasonable principles, along with Identity Determination and Welfare 
Determination, are precisely what give rise to the non-identity problem. In other words, in 
situations where P’s action determines whether and how Q exists, counter-intuitive conclusions 
follow from the intuitively forceful principles above. 
1.3 ISOLATING THE RELEVANT FACTORS 
Notice that this does not entail that there could be nothing wrong with non-identity cases 
like the Business-as-usual and Sarah cases. It is sufficient for wrongness that we demonstrate that 
the actions taken will eventually lead to a life or lives that are not even worth living. If our resource 
use causes future generations to fall below this threshold, then they are clearly harmed on the 
comparative account. If you knowingly conceive a child with a birth defect that severely shortens 
that child’s life and causes great pain for the entirety of that short life, then that child is harmed 
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because that child’s life is not worth living. Put broadly, if someone’s life is not worth living, and 
if our actions intentionally determined both that existence and the low welfare, then we have 
harmed that person, we have an account of that harm, and this harm easily generates the wrongness 
of the action. However, this explanation of wrongness is insufficient when it comes to non-identity 
cases. Non-identity cases focus on a specific welfare window. Outside of this window, there are 
those who, on the one hand, come into existence before this time and are not worse off than those 
who would have existed otherwise; and, on the other hand, there are those who come into existence 
much later and have lives that are not even worth living. Within this window are lives with welfare 
lower than those who would have existed otherwise, but not so low that these lives are not worth 
living. A complete account of wrongness must explain what is wrong with the action even if we 
focus only on this window. Thus, the aim of any solution to the non-identity problem will not be 
to find just any account of wrongness. We are not looking for a reason per se to call the act in 
question “wrong.” What is needed is an account that explains why it is wrong even if we only 
consider the window wherein no one who is created is positively worse off. 
If you are tempted to conclude that it is never wrong to conceive a child with a life worth 
living, note that the comparative account of harm does not entail this. Consider the following case.  
Sarah*: Sarah is on medication for a minor issue. Halting the medication would 
involve only a small sacrifice for Sarah. As it turns out, she wants to conceive, but 
the doctor tells her that if she conceives now, she will give birth to Trig—a child 
with a significant birth defect. If she waits and continues on her medication, she 
will give birth to Track, who will also have a significant birth defect due directly to 
her continuing her medication. Finally the doctor tells her that if she immediately 
stops using her current medication and instead takes a tiny pill for two months, she 
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will give birth to Track*—a perfectly healthy child. Track* would have the same 
overall identity as Track, but Track* would lack the birth defect. 
So, Sarah has three choices: she could bring about a certain combination of existence and 
welfare in Trig, or in Track, or in Track*. Our intuitions tell us she should conceive Track*. This 
is because Track* will be a perfectly healthy child. But note that Trig cannot exist without the 
defect, whereas Track can. So, if Sarah knowingly conceives one child with a significant birth 
defect, then she harms her child—because she has made Track worse off than he otherwise would 
have been—but she does not harm her child if she knowingly conceives Trig with his defect, for 
Trig is not made worse off than he otherwise would have been. Thus, assuming the truth of the 
comparative account of harm as it stands, we can ground the wrongness of conceiving a child with 
a life worth living when that same child could be made better off, but not when that child would 
not exist otherwise. This highlights some of the strangeness within the non-identity problem. We 
may conclude that it is perfectly acceptable to conceive one child with a defect when you could 
have conceived a healthy child, but that it is far worse to conceive another child with a defect when 
you could have conceived a healthy child. Thus, if to harm is to make someone worse off than he 
otherwise would have been, Sarah is not harming her child when she conceives Trig with a defect, 
but she is harming her child when she conceives Track with a defect. This is a perplexing outcome 
of the comparative account of harm, and it suggests that this account requires modification. 
If the outcome of Sarah* seems incorrect, then perhaps one might claim that it is just a 
brute fact that if Sarah knowingly conceives a child with a significant defect, she has done 
something wrong. If this were so, then it would always be wrong to do this. But that does not seem 
to be the case either. Suppose the doctor told Sarah that any child she conceives will have a 
significant birth defect, but not so significant that the child’s life would not be worth living. In this 
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case, Sarah will decide between a child with a defect and no child at all. Suppose, for example, she 
has a condition that ensures that she can only conceive blind children. If she chooses to conceive 
a blind child in this case, we probably do not have the same intuitions about wrongness via harm, 
especially if she is equipped to care fully for a blind child. Many have the intuition that it does not 
seem either harmful or wrong to conceive a child who will have a life worth living when you are 
unable to conceive a perfectly healthy child. Therefore, the choices available do matter, at least in 
generating our intuitions. If our intuitions are in fact tracking important moral properties, then we 
need to respond to these divergent intuitions.  
1.4 HOW TO RESPOND: PERSON-AFFECTING VS. IMPERSONAL APPROACHES 
Recognizing the principles at work will help to outline available avenues leading to 
potential solutions to the non-identity problem. There are two overly simple responses to avoid, at 
this point. First, someone could claim that while Sarah does make the worse choice when she 
decides to conceive Trig, she does not go so far as to actually commit a wrongdoing. However, it 
should be noted that, to generate a problem, we need not makes as strong a charge as wrongness 
in order to arrive at a counterintuitive conclusion. Perhaps you think that Sarah only makes the 
worse choice, but that she does not do something positively wrong. If this is the case, you might 
think that Sarah does something better for her child when she chooses the healthy child over the 
disabled child, but that it is not actually wrong to choose to have a disabled child. But this in itself 
is not enough to solve the problem of having reasonable principles and a counterintuitive 
conclusion. From the formulation of the argument so far, it turns out that there is no one affected 
for the worse. No one is worse off if Sarah gives birth to Trig. In fact, one could even argue that 
both Sarah and Trig are benefited in this scenario. Sarah would receive the small benefit of not 
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having to take a tiny pill for two months. And Trig would receive the arguable benefit of coming 
into existence. Therefore, even if you have the intuition that Sarah’s choice is not positively wrong, 
you would also have to agree neither choice is worse for anyone involved because none of the 
moral subjects would claim that Sarah should have acted differently for his or her sake. So, it is 
still not clear why that choice would be better for her child. Even if we grant for the sake of 
argument that the act is not wrong, one of Sarah’s choices seems less harmful than the other, and 
we still have no explanation of that.  
Perhaps, however, you think that the members of the community who are burdened with 
the care of a disabled child can claim to be made worse off, and this is what makes one choice 
better than the other. If so, then the second response to avoid is the following.  One might think 
that the reasons to choose Track over Trig involve the drain on resources and energy that a disabled 
child would bring to the family and the community. Disabled children tend to require additional 
accommodations when it comes to their rearing and education. Yet this is presumably ad hoc. It is 
likely not the case that, if you thought there was a problem with Sarah’s decision, then you had 
these concerns for the family and the education system in mind.6 Most people are not considering 
the school system when intuiting a problem with Sarah’s case. They are concerned for her child. 
And recall that the mother, Sarah, prefers this option, so the added familial strain should not matter. 
Most people intuit that considerations regarding the child himself are enough to generate a 
problem. And we certainly do not think that the drain on resources and energy is itself enough to 
justify not having a child in other cases. Suppose Sarah could only conceive a child with a defect, 
and that she was deciding between having a child with a defect and not having a child at all. If she 
chooses to have a child in this case, the drain on resources and energy would not be enough to 
 
6 David Boonin noted this while teaching a graduate seminar on the problem. 
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generate a problem. Likewise, any child born will be some strain on her family and on the school 
system. But when someone decides to have a (presumably healthy) child rather than no child at 
all, we tend not to lament additional resources and energy that will then be used to raise this child.7 
Person-Affecting Principles 
Since many of these intuitions are driven by concern for the child himself, what might be 
needed to solve the problem is what Parfit calls a “Person-Affecting Principle,” or PAP.8 All else 
equal, a PAP says that a choice will be worse if it makes people worse off. We may cash out the 
PAP in either a narrow or wide sense, and the sense will determine whose welfare should be 
weighed and how.9 A narrow PAP would state that a choice is worse if it makes some individual 
worse off than she otherwise would have been. This identity-dependent, comparative principle is 
how we commonly construe straightforward cases of harm to individuals. Again, if I steal one 
thousand dollars from you, I make you worse off than you otherwise would have been, and I 
thereby harm you in a narrow, person-affecting way. This harm can then ground wrongness, 
perhaps because it violates your rights.  
Some have claimed that the child’s rights have been violated in non-identity cases, and that 
narrow, rights-based concerns ground wrongness.10 However, these rights-based solutions are 
often forced to stray from the traditional structure of rights discourse when facing the non-identity 
problem. Though this does not mean that they are necessarily unsuccessful, it is reason to explore 
 
7 I will return to more complex versions of these types of considerations later, as they do have some traction with 
certain formulations of the problem. But it should be noted that the problem cannot be so easily dismissed with a 
casual appeal to the drain on families and educational systems. 
8 Parfit 1984: 370 & 2011: 219. 
9 Parfit 1984: 379, 396. 
10 See Tooley 1983, Woodward 1986, Smolkin 1999, and McBrayer 2008, for example.  
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other views that could account for both harm and rights-violations in commonsense terms. 
Typically, one must have interests that are violated in order to make a rights-based complaint. But 
no actual person in non-identity cases can make such a complaint, and, importantly, those who do 
not and will not exist do not have rights that can be violated by virtue of their non-existence. If 
rights-based approaches are indeed inadequate, and if the narrow PAP turns out to be the only 
relevant principle, then non-identity cases do not actually present moral problems—instead, they 
merely present challenges to our intuitions. The main problem with non-identity is that none of the 
individuals who exists is worse off than individuals otherwise would have been. So, if we restrict 
ourselves to only a narrow PAP, we might be forced to bite the bullet and conclude that our 
intuitions are incorrect and that there is nothing wrong in non-identity cases. 
That biting the bullet leads to counterintuitive conclusions is not by itself reason not to bite 
the bullet. It is, however, reason enough to explore other senses of the PAP. A wide PAP would 
entail that a choice is worse if it makes things worse for people in a more general sense.11 In 
Chapter Two, I examine and expand upon this wide sense of the PAP in order to set up my 
approach to the non-identity problem. 
Impersonal Approaches 
Given our intuitions about harm to future children or future generations, one could attempt 
to solve the problem through appeal to a PAP. Given the problems with many PAP-driven 
approaches, one might try to solve the problem by appealing to better and worse states of affairs, 
and not to the effects on any given individual—an impersonal approach. This could be done either 
by assessing the consequences of the different choices, or by assessing the character of the agent 
 
11 Parfit 1984: 396 & 2011: 219-220. 
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in question. If we are assessing the agent’s character—as a virtue ethicist would do—perhaps we 
will find that the act is wrong due to the agent’s acting from a bad character, regardless of the 
effect on moral subjects. If this is so, we can avoid appealing to a person-affecting account of harm 
and ground the wrongness elsewhere. This view cannot justify the intuition that Sarah harms her 
child—which, admittedly, may not be necessary for successfully determining wrongdoing, but 
which is nonetheless a virtue of a completely explanatory solution to the non-identity problem. 
The other avenue is the consequentialist approach. Even if no individual is harmed, the state of 
affairs where a disabled child is conceived is worse than the state of affairs where a healthy child 
is conceived, all else equal. This, too, would avoid an appeal to the comparative account of harm, 
but it is also beset with famous problems and may require significant revision in order to be a well-
rounded solution to the non-identity problem. The two most important problems with the approach, 
for our purposes, are the Mere Addition Paradox and the Repugnant Conclusion, outlined by 
Parfit.12 These are familiar objections, and while I do not wish to outline these concerns (or the 
many interesting responses to these concerns) in a detailed way here, I do wish to note that I aim 
in this work to bring personal considerations into my analysis and to shift the focus away from the 
effects produced—whether they be person-affecting or impersonal effects. Thus, I look elsewhere 
for a successful solution, though I do not deny the possibility that an acceptable impersonal 
solution is possible.  
1.5 AN OVERVIEW 
After encountering the non-identity problem, we are left with many important questions. 
When it is morally acceptable to conceive a child with a significant defect and when it is not? Is it 
 
12 These are outlined in detail in Reasons and Persons. See Parfit1984. 
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morally acceptable to harm the environment when this produces future generations with lower 
welfare over others with higher welfare? We also need to determine which people matter to us 
insofar as we are responsible agents, and how much. We need a clear account of what it means to 
harm someone, and we need to pinpoint harms that can generate wrongs. Finally, while there have 
been many proposed solutions to the non-identity problem, most bring with them some prohibitive 
factor, such as highly counterintuitive implications, the inability to solve more than one version of 
the problem, or the charge of being ad hoc.13 The problem requires a solution that meets the above 
needs without falling prey to the common objections.  
In the following chapters, I will demonstrate that my view meets the relevant criteria and 
provides an approach to the non-identity problem that allows for an intuitive, useful, and morally 
robust solution. I argue that there should be something more to the morality of creating certain 
lives than that they are merely worth living. By highlighting a crucial metaphysical distinction, I 
demonstrate that we are obligated to improve the lives of future persons over whom we hold a 
certain kind of responsibility—that is, responsibility over offices or positions that moral subjects 
will come to fill. Office caretakers, such as parents or leaders of state, are obligated to improve the 
lives of their charges, whoever they might be. When they fail to do so, they commit what I call a 
“de dicto harm,” even if no individual is harmed. Thus, the most salient feature of non-identity 
cases is the fact that someone of moral status will come to occupy a position over which some 
moral agent now holds the relevant kind of responsibility. 
I note here that it is possible that there is more than one successful solution to the non-
identity problem. That is, it is possible that the harm or wrongness of the acts in question is in fact 
overdetermined. So, while I do aim to provide a comprehensive approach to the non-identity 
 
13 See David Boonin’s forthcoming book on the non-identity problem. 
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problem that does not fall prey to the types of objections aimed at other solutions, I do not mean 
to suggest that I have thereby ruled out all other possible solutions. However, I do wish to analyze 
carefully and respond to solutions that draw on factors present in my solution, but which are 
nonetheless importantly flawed. 
In Chapter Two, I examine other attempts to formulate approaches centered on 
responsibility that involve variants on portions of my view and take into account considerations of 
roles, definite descriptions, and generalizable others. This helps to set up the requirements for a 
successful de dicto solution and to segue into my view, outlined in the following chapter. 
In Chapter Three, I outline a role-based approach that does not fall prey to the problems 
outlined in earlier attempts, and that meets the criteria for generating a successful solution. I 
explain the distinction between de re and de dicto senses of harm, and I examine which kind of 
harm is most relevant to non-identity cases. I arrive at the conditional conclusion that if harm does 
occur in non-identity cases, it must be de dicto harm. I provide positive reason for adopting a de 
dicto reading of harm in these cases by arguing that de dicto harm obtains when we stand in the 
right responsibility relation to offices that moral subjects will come to fill. I also respond to 
objections in this chapter. These objections help to formulate supporting views, such as a theory 
of how to weigh de re harm against de dicto harm. 
In Chapter Four, I apply my solution directly to future generations cases, focusing 
specifically on environmental issues, and I examine the practical and theoretical implications 
within that application. Since I have taken as my core case a simple procreation problem, it is 
important to spend time on the unique problems found within larger-scale future generations cases. 
I address the valuations entailed by various environmental positions and isolate those that generate 
the non-identity problem. Since my view is able to ground the prescriptions given by those 
18 
 
positions, I argue that such a solution is essential for validating much of the ethical posturing 
present in environmental activism and policymaking.  I also uncover a crucial difference between 
simple procreation cases and large-scale future generations cases by responding to objections 
about who has a responsibility to act as steward to future generations.  
In my final chapter, I assess our responsibility to species, both human and non-human. I 
adopt a very broad definition of species, and I examine whether we have special responsibilities 
over certain species offices. I also uncover parallels between issues in species ethics generally 
construed and the non-identity problem itself. It turns out that my role-based view allows for a 
useful method of analyzing these kinds of cases, and I apply that method to relevant questions in 
both bioethics and animal ethics. These applications all rely on an appeal to responsibility-relations 
between moral agents and generalizable others, so let us turn now to an exploration of these 
responsibility-based approaches. 
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CHAPTER 2: GENERAL PERSONS AND RESPONSIBILITY APPROACHES 
 
We appeal to a false dichotomy if we claim that a solution to the non-identity problem must 
be either person-affecting or impersonal. There is an argument to be made for a middle-ground 
approach. But what should a middle-ground approach look like? There are, as we will see, 
considerations to which we can appeal—but not considerations of actual persons, and not of overall 
utility. Instead, these are considerations of generalizable others. As we saw in Chapter One, there 
are narrow senses of the PAP and wide senses of the PAP. The narrow sense relies on an 
assessment of harm to actual individuals, but the wide sense relies on a more general assessment, 
and this generality leads to a useful and intuitive middle-ground approach. 
2.1 GENERAL PERSONS 
Parfit explores two possible senses of the wide PAP. The first he calls the “No-Difference 
View” or ND.14 According to ND, the fact of whether the persons affected are the same persons 
who would otherwise be affected makes no moral difference. We should be looking at how the 
decision affects persons, but the individual identities of the persons affected do not matter morally. 
That is, if the choice is worse for one person or group of people than it would be for another person 
or group of people, the different identities in the different outcomes do not matter at all. What 
matters is that the choice was worse for persons, but not that it was worse for any particular person. 
Notice that an appeal to ND would solve the non-identity problem, because Trig would be worse 
 
14 Parfit 2011: 219. 
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off than Track, even though Trig would not be worse off than he otherwise would have been. 
Similarly, the future generations who would result from our realizing Business-as-usual would be 
worse off than those future generations who would be the result of our not realizing Business-as-
usual. Since people are generally worse off—that is, worse off than those people in the alternative 
scenario, even though no one in particular is worse off—we can then claim that this grounds 
wrongness, assuming that the particular identities in question do not matter morally. This 
wrongness could then solve the two non-identity problem cases formulated in Chapter One. But 
the ability to solve these versions of the non-identity problem cannot be our only criterion for a 
solution to the non-identity problem. We must examine whether the principle holds water 
independent of this fact. Consider the case of the doctor: 
Doctor: A doctor is, for whatever reason, deciding which set of patients she is 
willing to take on. She may either take on very sick people and improve their health 
significantly—though she will leave them far short of being fully healthy—or she 
may take on only minimally unwell patients and quickly restore them to full health. 
Clearly, if this doctor opts for the latter choice, she is not being a particularly good doctor. 
But according to ND, her choice is the right choice, or at least the better choice. It does not matter 
who her individual patients are. All that matters is that her patients are better off now than her 
patients would have been had she made a different choice. This cannot be a wholly satisfying 
principle, then, for we know that a good doctor would not restrict her services to only healthy 
people. Thus, it looks as though, at least in some cases, ND fails to delineate successfully when it 
is important to consider moral subjects individually and not generally. 
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This type of concern causes Parfit to entertain the “Two-Tier View,” or TT, as an 
alternative.15 According to TT, we have pro tanto reasons to make things better for future people, 
but these reasons are weaker if they only make things generally better and not better for 
individuals. When I use the term ‘generally better’ here, I am referring to the idea of a general 
person as suggested by Parfit. According to him, we are referring to a general person when we talk 
about ‘her child’ or ‘the doctor’s patients.’ We are able to talk about these offices in a general 
sense without talking about the individuals who come to fill them. Parfit writes, 
Such uses of ‘her child’ and ‘him’ refer, not to a particular person, but to what we 
can call a general person. This phrase is merely an abbreviation. Like the Average 
American, a general person is not a person. A general person is a large group of 
possible people, one of whom will be actual…According to the Two-Tier View, we 
have stronger reasons to avoid doing what would be worse for particular people. 
We can here suppose that, on this view, these reasons would be twice as strong, so 
that, compared with benefits or burdens to particular people, benefits or burdens to 
general people matter morally only half as much. 
So, considerations of particular people and general people are tiered, with particular people 
garnering approximately twice as much considerability, according to Parfit’s TT view. This tiered 
approach may generate the intuitively correct conclusion regarding the Doctor case. The benefit 
to ‘her patients’ in general matters under TT, but it matters much less than the benefit she could 
provide to actual people who are sick. Though, generally speaking, her patients would enjoy higher 
welfare if she took on only the minimally unwell, her patients would enjoy far greater benefit 
individually if she takes on the very sick. Similarly, it would be generally beneficial to her patients 
if the doctor stayed abreast of the latest developments in her field; however, if she pursued this to 
the degree that she was unable to care properly for her actual, individual patients, then she is acting 
 
15 Parfit 2011: 219. 
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wrongly. However, the TT view remains rough around the edges, and the underlying principle 
requires further examination. 
While Parfit assumes for the sake of argument that particular person concerns are 
approximately twice as strong as general person concerns, he does not provide any reasoning to 
support this specific weight distribution; though he does leave open the possibility that the weight 
may be otherwise distributed. For our purposes, it is enough to focus on the claim that particular 
concerns outweigh general concerns to some degree. So, Sarah’s choosing to have an unhealthy 
child isn’t worse for that child; however, according to TT, she harms her general child more if she 
chooses to have that unhealthy child rather choosing than to have a healthy one. Throughout his 
examination, Parfit entertains reasons that might sway someone who is enticed by TT, though he 
in fact overall favors ND. 
Here is why Parfit believes that some will be inclined to reject ND and favor TT. Consider 
the case of the Medical Programs:16 
Program A: We test already pregnant women and cure the disease their children 
would have had. Those children who would have had the disease will not have to 
suffer the disease.  
Program B: We test women who will be pregnant and prevent the disease their 
children would have had. They have their children later—after the testing—and 
therefore they have different children than they would have had we not tested them 
for the disease.  
Program A would benefit primarily particular people. The actual children are made better 
off. Program B would benefit primarily general people. This program would make it the case that 
 
16 Parfit 2011: 221. I present simplified versions here. 
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whoever the children would be will be better off, because it would affect who will be conceived, 
not merely the welfare of those already conceived. Which program should be adopted? For Parfit, 
the answer depends on analyzing the effects on the moral subjects. He says, “[i]f there is a moral 
difference between these programs, this difference must depend on how these programs would 
affect these children.”17 So, let us stipulate some effects, and analyze the cases through the lenses 
of both ND and TT.  
Case One 
Either 
A: 1000 people live for 70 rather than 50 years, or 
B: 1000 people live for 70 years rather than another 1000 people who would 
live for 50 years. 
If we choose option A, then particular people will be benefited—namely, those particular 
people who get to live twenty extra years. If we choose option B, then only general people would 
be benefited—different people will come into existence and live for seventy years, and they will 
not be those people who would have existed for only fifty years. Through the lens of ND, both A 
and B are equally worthwhile, for if it makes no difference who in particular exists, then the fact 
that either option entails twenty extra years for the people in question makes it the case that the 
options are morally on par with each other. Through the lens of TT, A is clearly more beneficial 
than B. Since the benefit is the same (i.e., twenty extra years), it matters more (roughly twice as 
much, according to Parfit) that we benefit particular people than that we benefit general people. 
But now consider a second case that Parfit presents wherein the benefits to particular and general 
people are not equal under ND. 
 
17 Parfit 2011: 222. 
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Case Two 
Either 
A: 1000 people live for 70 years rather than 50 years (same as above), or 
C: 1000 people live for 70 years rather than another 1000 people who would 
live for 40 years  
On the one hand, a proponent of ND will claim that Program A should be canceled, because 
general people will enjoy a net benefit of thirty extra years rather than only twenty extra years. On 
the other hand, a proponent of TT will claim that Program C should be canceled. If Parfit’s version 
of TT is correct, and the benefits to general people matter only half as much, then adding thirty 
years of life for general people under Program C is equivalent to adding fifteen years of life for 
particular people. When compared to the benefit of twenty years that the actual people enjoy under 
Program A, we find that Program C should be canceled because it generates less overall benefit. 
Parfit believes that some might find this to be compelling reason to accept TT over ND. In the face 
of this possibility, he presents a third case that he believes will make it harder for those people to 
accept TT. 
Case Three 
A: Tom: 70 Dick: 50  Harry: never exists, or 
B: Tom: 50 Dick: never exists Harry: 70 
Again, according to ND, these options are equally good. Whoever exists in either case lives 
the same overall number of years. And, according to TT, B is worse than A, because it is worse 
for a particular person (Tom), and it is also not better for anyone in particular.  
At this point, Parfit continues with further cases of Tom, Dick, and Harry that lead us 
deeper into an analysis of the question of whether and to what extent the considerations of general 
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persons matter. While this is an extremely important question, he leaps from one sort of case to 
another without acknowledging crucial factors at play. While he favors ND, I claim that his 
challenge to TT is actually a challenge to the scope of ND. Sometimes ND will be appropriate, 
and sometimes it will not, and we should actually be considering whether we have reason to be 
indifferent or partial—not positing arbitrary tiers. Parfit fails to assess this question properly by 
taking an overly abstracted approach to the answer and focusing only on the effects produced for 
the general and particular subjects. However, as many have noted, it matters who is producing 
these effects, and this is a factor that Parfit leaves utterly unexplored.  
Note the differences between the two sorts of cases he entertains—medical program cases 
and cases of the generic creation of people. Those first cases involve a commonly recognized role 
of someone enacting programs that benefit people—a role that many in power occupy. Those who 
enact programs tend to have a responsibility to benefit. However, he then switches to highly 
generic cases about people who merely pop into existence, and asks the reader to consider whose 
benefits matter. These cases muddle our intuitions not, I believe, because TT (as stated) really 
presents useful challenges to ND, but because we do not have important information about who is 
doing the deciding, and therefore we have lost a guiding principle.  
As Rahul Kumar notes, what one does is morally significant and independent from what 
happens as a result of what one does.18 Kumar, too, believes that we have obligations to 
generalizable others, but unlike Parfit, he thinks it is highly important to look at the position the 
agent is in with respect to the subjects, and not merely at the effects produced for the subjects, 
generalized or particular. Caspar Hare also argues that agents have stronger moral obligations to 
generalizable others when these agents’ job descriptions require that they maximize general 
 
18 Kumar 2003. 
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benefit. An agent’s role matters morally, and role-centered considerations are worth serious 
examination. Let us begin with Kumar’s analysis of the moral considerations generated by an 
agent’s contract with generalizable others. 
2.2 CONTRACTS WITH GENERAL PERSONS 
Kumar claims that the comparative account of harm favored in generating the non-identity 
problem is misguided. What matters are not comparisons, rather, what matters are expectations. 
We should, then, be asking: what are the subjects’ expectations, and what are they justified in 
expecting from the agent? Assuming that future persons can be cast as tokens of a specific type, 
we may bear a relationship to that type—a relationship that is distinguished by a cluster of 
expectations. If we fail to meet those expectations, then we fail to respect this type of subject, and, 
for Kumar, this constitutes a moral failing. 
Reconsider the Tom, Dick, and Harry case in light of this analysis. It would be very strange 
to presume any particular set of expectations on the part of the subjects. This is because no one in 
particular is acting so as to affect the subjects. Now reconsider the Medical Program cases. In these 
cases, we are envisioning a social program aimed at benefiting future children. Politicians or 
policymakers commonly enact these programs, and we have a good basic understanding of what 
to expect of those who fill such roles. In fact, we often think that politicians and policymakers have 
a very general responsibility to whoever ends up under the umbrella of their policy (or law, statute, 
etc.), which is some explanation of why ND seems to be the best way to approach Case One, and 
perhaps might be why Parfit himself overall intuitively prefers ND. While Parfit thinks that the 
Tom, Dick, and Harry case is evidence that we should favor ND over TT, it is actually fairly weak 
in this respect. The intuitions this case generates are not particularly clear cut, and certainly less 
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strong than those generated by Case One. However, this weakness in the Tom, Dick, and Harry 
case is itself evidence that our moral conclusions in creation cases are based at least in part on our 
expectations regarding the role of the agent, and absent any role considerations, we are left with a 
dearth of relevant information. Kumar’s analysis corroborates this, but is his view strong enough 
to take on the non-identity problem? 
Kumar’s conclusion relies heavily on the claim that a wrong can occur without a 
concomitant harm. Thus, he explicitly rejects the “no harm, no foul” intuition that helps to generate 
the problem in the first place. Consider a scenario wherein someone fires a gun at an innocent 
bystander (who is ignorant of this threat), but the gun jams and no one is hurt. We still think that 
the would-be shooter has done something wrong, even though no harm results. It is not obvious 
that Kumar’s reliance on this claim is particularly useful, given that risking harm is often wrong 
without being harmful. Nonetheless, let us continue with the argument at hand.  Kumar writes: 
One person may wrong another without leaving that person worse-off through such 
things as insults, humiliations, intentional slights, “looking through a person,” 
expressions of a lack of trust, many kinds of paternalism, and, in general, interfering 
with an aspect of a person’s life over which she rightly has sole sovereignty. For 
though one may not have made the other worse-off, the way in which one has 
related to the other may still express a failure to have appropriately recognized and 
taken account of a person’s value as capable of rational self-governance. A person 
can be wronged, then, simply in virtue of how she figures, or does not figure, in 
how one is rationally disposed to relate to her.19 
Given these claims, Kumar argues that the focus should not be on what happened—or on 
better or worse effects on the subject. Rather, the focus should be on what was done by the agent. 
In the gun case, what ultimately happened was utterly benign, but what was done was clearly 
wrong. And we can focus on what-was-done through a principled approach to this analysis that 
 
19 Kumar 2003: 109. 
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Kumar believes captures the wrongness of non-identity cases, and this is the contractualist 
approach.  
There is a type of person with whom we should enter into a morally binding contract of 
mutual respect, and that is the type of person who is capable of rational self-governance. When we 
fail to respect this type of person properly, we do something wrong even if no one is made worse 
off.  And we do not need to know anything particular about persons of this type to know what 
(certain of) their expectations will be. All we have to do is consider what interests the type of 
person with rational self-governance with whom we stand (or will stand) in a relation will have, 
and then act according to those expectations. This sort of type/token distinction is important, given 
that Kumar is attempting to solve the non-identity problem. Since parents can know, generally 
speaking, what distinctive cluster of expectations their child type will have with respect to the 
parent/child relationship, they can meet—or fail to meet—those legitimate expectations before 
their token child even exists. There may be a temporal gap between the parental action and the 
point at which the child has enough rational self-governance to formulate a complaint, but this gap 
is irrelevant, according to Kumar, given that the parents already know what type their token child 
will be.  
There are two main problems with this approach. The first has to do with the formulation 
of a complaint by the token child. Kumar concludes that the particular, token child has a particular 
complaint. That child can say, “I have been wronged” and be referring to him-or-herself with this 
use of ‘I.’ First of all, this is strange. The alternative for the child in non-identity cases is non-
existence. Insofar as that child’s life is good enough, a personal complaint seems not to follow. 
Though Kumar’s focus is on what the parents have done and not on comparing outcomes, it is still 
the case that the parents failed to live up to the expectations of a child type, and not of a token 
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child. And this leads to a greater concern than mere strangeness. The expectations of the token 
child cannot contain an expectation not to be born with a serious defect or ailment, for that 
individual child could not exist without the defect. Of course, this is merely stipulated in non-
identity cases, but if there were an option for the child to exist without the defect, then the 
comparative account would neatly explain wrongness via harm, and the case would fail to qualify 
as a non-identity case. Thus, even if the child reaches a state of rational self-governance and a full 
understanding of the contract in question, the child cannot say “I have been wronged,” even if the 
parents have failed to bring into existence the better off child.  
This criterion of rational self-governance leads to the second problem with Kumar’s 
account. For obvious reasons, contractualist obligations do not obtain if the parties do not consent 
in the requisite way to the contract, and consent requires some degree of rationality and self-
governance. Kumar believes that the child can consent once a state of rational self-governance is 
reached, and I do not disagree. However, central to these procreative non-identity cases is the 
possibility that parents bring into existence children with serious defects or disabilities. Such 
children could easily have lives worth living while failing ever to reach the requisite capacity for 
rational self-governance. Therefore, Kumar’s account, as stated, can only account for a specific 
class of non-identity cases wherein the moral subjects reach rational self-governance; and it cannot 
account for cases involving many marginal humans. Clearly then, this could be, at best, an 
incomplete solution. Furthermore, it is evidence that there is intuitively something else at work 
making the actions in non-identity cases wrong, aside from contractualist concerns—which would 
fail to explain wrongness in many non-identity cases. While Kumar claims to shift the focus from 
what happened to what was done, he still retains enough of an emphasis on the particulars of the 
child to generate serious concerns with his approach. Nonetheless, he claims that the focus should 
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be on generalizable responsibility, and we can still explore whether other such approaches may 
work.  
2.3 CONFLATING DE DICTO AND DE RE 
Perhaps there is an easily identified equivocation at play in non-identity cases, and 
addressing this equivocation will help to uncover important factors related to responsibility. In 
earlier work, David Boonin makes a crucial discovery on this matter.20 Given the standard 
characteristics of non-identity cases, it is actually quite easy to equivocate between the de re and 
de dicto senses of, say, ‘her child.’ Literally translated, de re means “of the thing,” and de dicto 
means “of what is said.” The de re sense refers to the actual, particular individual. The concomitant 
referent in the de dicto sense is a sort of definite description rather than an ostensible entity. So, 
the de dicto sense of ‘her child’ refers to the occupant of the office of ‘her child,’ whoever that 
person might be. For example, there is an office of president of the United States. Barack Obama 
currently fills this office and is the de re individual referred to when I say “the president has two 
daughters.” However, when I say, “the president is commander in chief of the military,” I may be 
referring to anyone who fills the office of president, because whoever who is president is also 
commander in chief. A de dicto interpretation separates the general nature of the office in question 
from the various particular, actual subjects who ultimately fill that office. De dicto reference tells 
us that there is an office of ‘her child’ or ‘the president,’ but it also tells us that different individual 
children or presidents could fill these offices, depending on which subjects actually end up in those 
offices.  
 
20 Boonin 2008. 
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With this distinction in mind, let us look to an argument presented by Boonin suggesting 
that the de re reading is the only morally relevant reading of non-identity cases. Boonin provides 
some reason to dismiss the non-identity problem by arguing that, due to the fact that it is easy to 
conflate the de re and de dicto readings of the phrase ‘her child’ in, say, the Sarah case, we actually 
intuit a problem where none exists.21 He attempts to bolster this hypothesis by testing our intuitions 
in what he claims is a morally analogous case that avoids conflation of the two readings and makes 
evident the sense in which the de re reading is the morally relevant one.22  
Barney case: Barney has the choice to save one of two women, both of whom have 
recently had sex. These sex acts will lead to their very shortly conceiving children. 
One child will be incurably blind, the other sighted, and Barney knows this. It is 
also minimally inconvenient for him to save the sighted child because his mother 
is further away. Barney saves the woman who will have the blind child because it 
is more convenient for him to do so.23 
According to Boonin, Barney’s act should be just as harmful under a de dicto reading as 
Sarah’s act is in the Sarah case, and just as innocuous under a de re reading. What is relevant in 
these cases is the de re reading—the consideration of the actual persons involved. We are not, 
therefore, tempted to impose a de dicto reading on this case. Barney saves the particular woman 
who will bear a particular blind child over the particular woman who will bear a particular sighted 
child, and a de re reading captures the moral force of this action. Since most people would not 
intuit that Barney’s action is morally wrong, and since, according to Boonin, this example is 
 
21 Boonin 2008: 146-7. 
22 Boonin 2008: 148. I present a simplified version of this case. 
23 Boonin actually begins with a simpler case, which I have omitted here due to considerations of length and because 
Boonin claims that this first case and the Barney case are also analogous. Interested parties should consult the article 
in question. 
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morally analogous to the pregnancy case; it must be the clear separation of the de re and de dicto 
factors that corrects our intuition. Therefore, Sarah’s actions in the original example were not 
morally wrong, and we have reason to reject our intuitions regarding the conclusion of the non-
identity problem.  
Yet, the Barney case does not rest on the moral judgment on which Boonin claims it rests 
and therefore is not appropriately morally analogous to the Sarah case, making it a poor 
explanation of our intuitions and insufficient justification for adopting a de re reading of non-
identity cases. When stating the parallels between the Barney case and the pregnancy case, Boonin 
writes, 
[i]n both cases, the person chooses to do the act that results in an incurably blind 
child being conceived after the choice has been made, and a sighted child not being 
conceived who otherwise would have been conceived. And in both cases, the 
person makes the choice simply because it is more convenient for them to do so.24  
Actually, this discussion of the cases is oversimplified, and the Barney case involves 
greater moral consideration than the analogy can sustain. His is not a case of simple life creation. 
This is because the lives of the unconceived future child and the mother are at stake. When intuiting 
blame or praise in this case, we must consider the morally relevant question of whether or not we 
should avoid saving someone’s life merely because her nearly-conceived child will be blind. This 
is clearly not analogous to the Sarah case in a morally relevant way. Our intuitions in this case 
arise out of our aversion to letting a woman die simply because of the blindness of her possible 
child. If a woman conceives a blind child, it is not as if her life becomes less valuable in some way. 
Consider someone who sees both women shouting for help.  He swims past the first woman, and 
as he passes, he (clairvoyantly) says, “I won’t save you.  The child you are about to conceive will 
 
24 Boonin 2008: 151. 
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be born blind.” This sort of action is clearly unlike Sarah’s action. Her pregnancy dilemma does 
not entail the consideration to end a life in order to save another. Thus, this example is morally 
disanalogous and cannot provide us with a useful assessment of the de re and de dicto factors 
within non-identity cases. But an important point remains to be explored. It appears as if this 
distinction is highly relevant to the non-identity problem, and indeed it seems as if we may easily 
conflate the two senses when encountering non-identity cases. Let us examine whether a careful 
separation of these senses is needed to ground a role-based approach. 
2.4 PARTIALITY TOWARD GENERAL PERSONS 
Caspar Hare’s middle-ground approach appeals to a kind of impersonal responsibility 
through reliance on the de re/de dicto distinction. Hare eschews the standard comparative account 
of harm to individuals in favor of a particular assessment of states of affairs. The focus is not on 
the whole of a state of affairs, but on whether a state of affairs is de dicto better or worse. 
Sometimes, it is our impersonal responsibility to make things de dicto better. This is contrasted 
with the standard comparative account of harm, which asks whether we have made someone (not 
some state of affairs) de re better. 
To make something de dicto better is to make sure that an office is filled by an occupant 
who is better off than an occupant otherwise would have been. Hare claims that it is appropriate 
to focus on de dicto betterness when two factors obtain. First, it is appropriate when we are partial 
to the office in question. For example, Sarah is surely partial to the office of ‘her child,’ and so she 
ought to care about de dicto bettering that office. Second, it is appropriate when the partiality-
based concern has no de re expression. That is, what is de re better for the person(s) in question 
can have no guiding role in decision-making. So, when we are partial to offices but not to the de 
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re occupants of those offices, then we ought to consider how to make things de dicto better. To 
illustrate he gives the example of the safety officer.25  
Safety Officer: It is Tess’s job to reduce the severity of automobile accidents in her 
state. So, she tightens seat belt regulations (so to speak) and is pleased to discover 
that this greatly reduces the severity of automobile accidents in her state.  
Given the fact that automobile accidents usually happen in a mere matter of seconds, and 
given the fact that it takes people at least that long to belt up, it is likely that most people who were 
in automobile accidents after the regulations were put into place would not have been involved in 
an accident otherwise. Thus, Tess harms the victims of automobile accidents in the de re 
comparative sense. The actual individuals are worse off than they otherwise would have been, 
because Tess’s regulations determined that they suffered accidents instead of other people 
suffering accidents. However, she also makes the accident victims de dicto better because she 
makes the victims, whoever they might be, better off than the accident victims otherwise would 
have been. It seems clear that Tess has strong reason to be partial to the office of ‘accident victims,’ 
given her job description, and it is also the case that, given the nature of the regulations, her 
partiality has no de re expression. There are no particular, individual people whom she intends to 
benefit—that is, she would certainly not be aiming to benefit, say, the individuals Anne and Ramon 
specifically, and not Maria and Jared specifically. She is considering how best to convey benefits 
more generally. Similarly, Sarah is partial to the office of her child, given her role as parent, and 
given that office has no de re expression since her decision is made at a time before her actual 
child exists, and since either choice will avoid de re harm. But is this enough to solve the non-
identity problem? 
 
25 Hare 2007: 516. I present a simplified version of the case. 
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As it stands, Hare’s view is inadequate because he both fails to motivate properly his claims 
about partiality and because he requires the absence of de re concerns, which leads to 
counterintuitive implications. His view also falls prey to similar concerns outlined above about the 
child’s supposed complaint to which Kumar’s view fell prey. Hare states that the child can say, 
“you failed to show appropriate de dicto concern for your child, and I am your child,” thus the 
child would seem to have a legitimate complaint.26 But this is clearly an equivocation on precisely 
the distinction that Hare wishes to highlight. The first instance of ‘your child’ in the above quote 
should be given a de dicto reading, and the second a de re reading. And under the appropriate 
interpretations, the individual child still does not have a personal complaint because that child was 
not de re worse off as a result of the decision. As I will argue in the next chapter, we do not need 
a personal complaint from the child in order to generate harm in these kinds of non-identity cases. 
We do need something like Hare’s partiality criterion in order to successfully generate claims of 
harm, but as it stands, Hare’s account of partiality is inadequate. 
Hare claims that, in some cases, partiality, or a “focused concern for…a person or group 
of people,” should play a guiding role in decision-making.27 But upon reflection, requiring mere 
partiality can lead to charges of arbitrariness and a failure to generate obligations. Surely parents 
are in fact partial to their children and safety officers are in fact partial to their citizens, but what 
if I develop a focused concern for other people’s children, or for citizens of another state? That is, 
what if I develop a focused concern for some office when I do not stand in a particularly relevant 
relation to that office? Suppose I meet a stranger who confides in me that she plans to conceive a 
child. Upon hearing this, I become, for whatever reason, very partial to the office of her child. 
 
26 Hare 2007: 38. 
27 Hare 2007: 32. 
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Now, given that I am partial to the office of her child, and given that this office has no de re 
expression, I now have an obligation to make things de dicto better, given Hare’s argument. But 
clearly I do not have this obligation. Of course it might be nice (albeit rather odd) if I tried to help 
this stranger better the office of ‘her child,’ but that is not all that Hare can be concluding, because 
that would be insufficient to ground wrongness in non-identity cases. It would be nice if Sarah had 
the fully healthy child, but this in itself would not make it positively wrong for her to choose the 
alternative. Perhaps Hare intends that we have obligations to make things de dicto better not when 
we become partial on a whim, but when we become partial in cases where we should be partial. 
Parents should be partial to their children; safety officers should be partial to their citizens, etc. 
Yet this creates a puzzle for Hare’s solution, because now we need an account of when we should 
be partial and when we should not. When, for example, should we be partial to future generations? 
On a more charitable interpretation, Hare means something stronger or more precise when he talks 
of partiality, but without a clear account of what generates obligations in these sorts of cases, we 
still do not have an adequate approach to the non-identity problem. I take up this task in the next 
chapter, and my analysis is ultimately inclusive of de re considerations, so let us take a moment 
here to explore Hare’s take on de re considerations. 
Recall Hare’s assertion that the partiality concerns can have no de re expression in order 
for de dicto betterness to matter morally.  This, he thinks, is what makes de dicto concern 
appropriate. And I agree that the absence of certain de re considerations—coupled with justified 
partiality concerns—do render de dicto betterness morally important and appropriate. But this is 
not the only place where such concerns are important. We can have appropriate de dicto concerns 
even while these concerns have a relevant de re expression. Suppose Tess is facing a choice as a 
safety officer, and suppose that that choice will affect the same de re individuals—either for better 
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or for worse. By choosing what is de re better for the citizens, she is also choosing what is de dicto 
better for them because she is still making the office of ‘her citizens’ better off than it would have 
been had she opted for the alternative. She still has reason to be partial to her citizens, and these 
are still de dicto reasons—that is, reasoning that applies primarily to general persons—but it is 
simply that in this case her de dicto partiality to this office requires that she consider de re harm 
and benefit at this time. She still has reason to make things de dicto better even when the offices 
have relevant de re expressions. Thus, Hare is wrong to suggest that de re expressions or concerns 
must be absent or irrelevant in order for this approach to be appropriate. Requiring this is too 
strong, and it fails to capture the nuance of many responsibility-relations. Responsibility (or 
partiality) to generalizable others does not disallow simultaneous responsibility to particular 
people.  
Hare’s is an attempt to provide positive reason to adopt de dicto concerns that he has 
uncovered as morally important, but far more work needs to be done in order to properly motivate 
and justify this type of approach. In the next chapter, I propose a middle-ground approach that, 
like Parfit’s, Kumar’s, and Hare’s, requires that we consider the moral status of generalizable 
others. I appeal to responsibilities that agents incur by virtue of their filling certain roles. These 
roles generate responsibility-relations between agents and subjects. These responsibilities may 
have both de re and de dicto expressions, and they do not entail that individuals who are not de re 
harmed can make a personal complaint. I provide an account that explains how our role-based 
responsibilities arise and, importantly, when we ought to be partial. My account also allows that 
we have obligations to benefit those we create even when they lack rational self-governance. After 
presenting the particulars of my view, I entertain potential objections and flesh out important 
components of this analysis. Under a general, de dicto interpretation, we may arrive at the 
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intuitively correct accounts of harm and benefit, but we must first find adequate motivation for 
this approach. One might worry about certain cases wherein de dicto harm and benefit seem 
morally irrelevant. Thus, the real challenge lies in establishing our responsibility to generalizable 
others, which will allow us to delineate precisely when de dicto concerns are morally relevant.  
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CHAPTER 3: A ROLE-BASED VIEW 
 
There is a middle-ground approach that allows for general-person concerns, grounds our 
moral obligations, includes moral subjects with varying degrees of rationality, and successfully 
establishes a baseline for the relevance of de dicto concerns. This approach to the problem coheres 
nicely with many moral intuitions—not just those related to the non-identity problem. To 
understand this approach, we must first separate carefully the senses by which we refer to moral 
subjects. These different senses can generate different moral obligations, depending on the roles 
of the agents and subjects in question. Like Kumar, I claim that it is important to recognize our 
relationships to generalizable others, but I reject his contractualist approach.28 The roles 
themselves generate what Hare calls “de dicto concerns.” Given certain roles that we undertake, 
and certain positions that moral subjects fill, it turns out that we can indeed commit harms with 
respect to those whose lives are worth living, and who would otherwise not exist. Here, I provide 
a detailed account of the specific harms and potential wrongdoing involved in non-identity cases. 
I argue that the responsibility borne by certain roles dictates the rightness or wrongness of many 
actions. I then respond to several important objections to my view. These responses help to flesh 
out precisely which factors are at work in non-identity cases, and they help to determine how we 
ought to go about assessing our role-based responsibilities. 
 
28 Kumar 2003. 
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3.1 REFERRING TO THOSE WE CREATE 
Much of the discussion of the non-identity problem focuses primarily on the moral subjects 
who do not yet exist (children, future generations, etc.) and secondarily on the agents who act so 
that future individuals exist with certain levels of welfare. The direction of this approach runs from 
the subjects to the agents. We find out whether the agent has done something permissible when we 
ascertain the effect on the subjects. This approach reaches its simplest form in Parfit’s discussion 
of general people and the drawbacks of TT and ND (outlined in the previous chapter). By the time 
we get to Case Three with Tom, Dick, and Harry, all we assessing are the potential effects on the 
people created. When there is no mention of who is doing the creating, this leads to significant 
difficulties and conflicting or confounding intuitions. However, as Kumar and Hare allude, these 
difficulties arise because it in fact matters who the agents are—more specifically, it matters what 
roles they fill and oversee—and leaving these agents in anonymous abstraction obscures a useful 
approach to the problem. 
When I talk of roles, positions, or offices, I am appealing to de dicto claims about 
descriptions that moral subjects can meet with respect to offices that can be filled. This can, of 
course, be contrasted with de re claims about the actual individuals who come to exist. As we saw, 
others have recognized this distinction and its relevance to the problem at hand.29 However, these 
other views fall prey to important objections—objections that my view can avoid. De dicto claims 
may seem problematic because they appear to be clearly relevant in some cases and utterly 
irrelevant in others. Appealing to their relevance without delineating what makes them relevant 
will quickly set one up for serious objections. I provide a criterion for determining the moral 
 
29 See Hare 2007 and Boonin 2008. 
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salience of de dicto claims. This is the criterion of responsibility over offices. It provides 
independent support for my appeal to de dicto claims within this approach to the non-identity 
problem. 
To uncover this criterion, let us return to the initial Sarah case. Originally, we were working 
with two possible referents of Sarah’s ‘future child’: (1) the person who would exist if Sarah took 
the pills and (2) the (other) person who would exist if Sarah did not take the pills.  (1) and (2) are 
both de re referents. That is, they mean to refer to the actual individuals who would come into 
existence if a given course of action were taken. There is, however, another way to refer to the 
‘Sarah’s child.’ This is the de dicto sense of ‘Sarah’s child.’ Recall that the de dicto sense refers 
to (3) any occupant of the office of ‘her child,’ whoever that person might be. An office in this 
sense is an abstract entity that can be described in specific ways and could be filled by various 
subjects, given differing circumstances. Importantly, moral agents may oversee these offices.  
When considering a person who might or might not exist, it is, as Boonin noted, easy to 
conflate or ignore this distinction between de re and de dicto senses of ‘Sarah’s child.’30 To see 
the difference in non-identity terms, consider the following. If I say of a wealthy friend who I know 
has just given birth, “her child will be well-off,” I am referring to her actual child. If I say of a 
wealthy friend who has not even conceived but plans to conceive at some point, “her child will be 
well-off,” I am then referring to her child more generally as anyone who comes to fill the office. 
When assessing the simple non-identity case that generates the problem, we should be aware of 
whether we are referring to one de re child, another de re child, or to the de dicto sense of 
someone’s child in general. This awareness, it turns out, is crucial for justifying claims of harm 
and benefit. 
 
30 See Boonin 2008. 
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According to the comparative account discussed earlier, to harm or benefit someone in 
the de re sense is to act such that a particular individual is made worse or better off, respectively. 
On the other hand, to harm or benefit in the de dicto sense is to fill the office in question with 
someone who is worse off than an office holder would have been—that is, in de dicto cases of 
harm or benefit, we can arrive at Welfare Determination before or without Identity 
Determination. Thus, we may now make an important addendum to the comparative account of 
harm. Recall the original formulation: 
Comparative Harm: P’s act is harmful if P’s act causes Q to be worse off than Q 
otherwise would have been. 
Extrapolated here are the two components of the comparative account: 
De re sense: Q refers to an actual, particular individual (or individuals). 
De dicto sense: Q refers to the generalizable office holder (or holders). 
With the de dicto sense, we do not harm someone in particular. Instead we commit a more 
abstract harm by failing to fill the office appropriately, thereby making an office holder worse off 
(in the de dicto sense) than an office holder could have been. A closer examination of these senses 
will help to illuminate this distinction.  
The actual individuals who ultimately constitute the future children we have in mind are 
things themselves—or de re entities.31 Such things, insofar as they exist, are fully determinate with 
respect to their physical properties. If Sarah is realized, then her child will be an actual person who 
will have at any given point a perfectly specific height, weight, hair color, genetic makeup, etc. 
The de dicto sense of ‘her child,’ however, need not turn on these material considerations. A de 
dicto entity may or may not exist in the physical world, and the office it would fill supersedes any 
 
31 The idea of “things themselves” is taken from a discussion of offices by Pavel Tichy. See Tichy 2004. 
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physical attributes.32 Keep in mind that a de dicto entity is not accessible by ostension. The de 
dicto sense is a sort of definite description that allows us to associate actual entities with the 
abstract, or conceptual, characteristics for which they qualify. Consider Sarah’s child. While the 
actual, physically determinate child is a concrete subject, nothing about the child’s material 
measurements is a prerequisite for its occupying the office of ‘Sarah’s child,’ save, perhaps, for 
the fact that a physical person must occupy this office in order for the office to be filled at all. As 
long as the future person in question is a person, it matters not what his height, hair color, etc. is. 
Something or other will be the case regarding his material measurements, but no specific 
measurement will by itself qualify or disqualify him as Sarah’s future child.  
Thus, there are inherent and non-inherent attributes of a de dicto entity. The inherent 
attributes are whatever qualifies a thing to fill the office in question. For our purposes, the office 
of ‘her child’ must be filled by a person to be filled at all, just like the office of ‘my car’ must be 
filled by a vehicle with parts that match the description of a car, insofar as it is filled at all. Non-
inherent attributes are any of the variable physical properties that can be expressed by the things 
that fill these offices, for example, the weight of a future person at t1, or the make and model of 
my car. Notice that the inherent attributes are subject to de dicto restrictions. That is, the parts that 
make up my car could be disassembled, widely dispersed, and certain parts could be melted down 
to make other objects. Thus, my car would no longer exist, not because the physical parts of my 
car no longer existed, but because these parts fail to fit the description of a car.  
This difference between inherent and non-inherent attributes demonstrates that an 
individual’s physical properties and de dicto properties are actually closely intertwined. To talk 
 
32 That its occupant is physical is often a prerequisite for a de dicto entity, but any further specification of its physical 
properties usually is not. 
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about individuals in a meaningful way, we must employ some de dicto considerations. Without 
them, physical objects are what Tichy calls “pure individuators” that are “bare and colourless.”33 
That is, without de dicto considerations, the de re sense would merely pick out or lay bare actual 
objects, but this individuation would not allow us to ascertain important senses of those objects. 
Suppose you ask me to pick up your child at the playground. I then go to the playground and am 
able to individuate several children. However, this individuation is pointless unless I know which 
child fills the office of ‘your child.’ Only when the relevant de dicto criteria are met does the 
individuation matter in this case. Similarly, suppose that I do not have a car. It would be deeply 
misguided to infer from this that a certain car of a specific make, model, and color does not exist. 
How could we even know the make, model, and color of my non-existent car? However, it is 
perfectly comprehensible to say that my car does not exist, in this case, as long as the office of ‘my 
car’ is unoccupied. The de dicto sense allows us to ascertain that the office of ‘my car’ is not 
currently filled, and that much is clear. So de dicto considerations matter because it matters 
whether the objects we are discussing can in fact fill various offices. While it is certainly the case 
that the objects of discussion in non-identity cases fill certain offices, the features of non-identity 
cases render the de dicto sense of harm more apt than de re sense of harm. The de dicto 
considerations may take over specifically when non-identity concerns arise because the de re 
entities do not yet exist in non-identity cases, and these considerations provide independent 
motivation for the importance of the de dicto reading. This is likely what Hare had in mind when 
he stipulated that de dicto betterness matters when there is no de re expression available. 
Recall the limitations of de re considerations discussed above. In effect, these limitations 
allow that particular qualities individuate an entity, but much of what is interesting about the 
 
33 Tichy 2004: 717. 
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individual comes from our apprehending it in the de dicto sense. We can pick out a car of a certain 
make, model, and color; but without de dicto considerations, we would have no way of ascertaining 
whether it fills the office of my car or your car or a stranger’s car. In non-identity cases, before the 
decision in question is made, the opposite occurs. We know that the office of ‘her child’ will be 
filled, but we do not yet have the means by which we can point to the actual persons who will 
come to fill the office of ‘her child.’ And it is certainly not the case that no important considerations 
relevant to a given case can arise from a solely de dicto interpretation. If you turn sixteen and 
overhear that your parents have bought you a car, then you may be excited even though you have 
no de re knowledge about your actual car.  
Thus, we have some reason to prioritize the de dicto reading of non-identity cases precisely 
because the de re referent of ‘Sarah’s child’ does not exist at all, and this lack of existence is in 
fact a prerequisite for the problem to arise. Note that this is only some reason, though not by itself 
sufficient reason. De dicto considerations are not guaranteed to be morally relevant; Sarah may 
have de dicto concerns about someone else’s child, but, prima facie, these cannot match her de 
dicto concerns about her own child in moral relevance. The point is that too often we only address 
the de re reading of non-identity cases, and it is the de re reading itself that generates the problem. 
The problem cases always involve offices that de re persons will come to fill but have not yet 
filled.  
Since we are looking for way to solve to the non-identity problem, and since the parameters 
of the problem require that the future person does not yet exist, it is misleading to refer to the future 
person (or persons) only in the de re sense. If we are going to appeal to de re considerations in a 
robust manner, we must decide upon one person or the other to refer to. But it is unknown who 
will be an actual individual and who will end up as merely possible, and equivocating between de 
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re referents creates confusion.  We do, however, know which office or position will be filled, and 
we can use that knowledge to determine harm and benefit—and thereby what the right course of 
action will be—without assuming that harm or benefit must be conditional on the existence of one 
de re entity or another. Therefore, these epistemic and temporal considerations render de dicto 
reference clearly worth considering in non-identity cases specifically. We can indeed analyze the 
de dicto reading in addition to the de re one, and I will show why we are justified in giving moral 
priority to the de dicto analysis when encountering non-identity cases that contain a responsible 
agent, some de dicto referent, and no concurrent de re entity filling the office in question. 
3.2 PRIORITIZING DE DICTO HARM 
One may, at this point, object in the following way. All I have shown is that, at the time 
before the decision is made, de re considerations are not the only factors, due to the temporal and 
epistemic restraints—that is, we do not yet know who will actually come into existence. I have 
highlighted the de dicto considerations without providing substantial reason to adopt them over de 
re considerations specifically in non-identity cases. And without positive reason to do this, and 
with the assumption that the comparative account of harm is viable, we are left with two possible 
alternatives. Either there is harm in non-identity cases, and it must therefore arise from de dicto 
considerations; or there simply is no harm at all, and thereby no wrongdoing, and our intuitions 
have led us astray.  
The question we should now ask is whether we have sufficient reason to morally prioritize 
the de dicto harm (which obtains) over the de re harm (which does not obtain, again, assuming the 
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comparative account of harm) when assessing non-identity cases.34 Parfit himself originally 
implies that the answer is no. He arguably rejects the de dicto reading in his earlier work with his 
example of a general in a war:35  
General: We seem warranted in deeming someone a good general if he is always 
on the winning side. However, this estimation is not actually warranted if the 
general always switches to the winning side right before the battle ends, making 
him only de dicto a good general.  
The suggestion that follows is that if we ought to favor a de re reading of the General case, 
then we ought to favor a de re reading of the Sarah case.  
In response to this example, Hare rightly notes that “it does not follow from the fact that 
de dicto betterness is not always morally significant that it is never so.”36 He then gives the example 
of Tess the safety officer, which we encountered in the previous chapter. Tess is what I call an 
“office caretaker.” It is her role to better the office of ‘accident victims,’ whoever they might be. 
What matters, then, in at least the Tess case, is the de dicto reading of the harm.  
Given the above case and the original case, it is now clear that, at times, a de re reading is 
morally relevant—say, the General case—and that, at times, a de dicto reading is morally 
relevant—say, the Safety Officer case. We need to decide which is the morally relevant reading 
for non-identity cases. If the de dicto reading is indeed morally relevant, then we can account for 
harm in a way that previously seemed unavailable. I claim that both harm and our intuitions of 
 
34 The following analysis of this question is taken directly from an article in which I assess our responsibility to those 
who do not exist. See Haramia 2013. 
35 Parfit 1984: 360. 
36 Hare 2007: 516. 
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wrongness can be grounded in legitimate moral concern arising from de dicto considerations 
coupled with our responsibilities as office caretakers.  
3.3 THE RESPONSIBILITY CRITERION 
We are now in a position to examine carefully the responsibility criterion, which will allow 
us to delineate the moral relevance of de dicto harm through appeal to our responsibilities as office 
caretakers. By exploring certain cases that are analogous to non-identity cases in an important 
respect, I will show that de dicto harm is morally relevant harm in cases where we do not know 
(or need not know) at the time of the action the identities of the persons involved. In cases such as 
these, we often have moral reason to make things better for the office holders in general, whoever 
they might be. The cases presented below are clearly de dicto relevant, and they highlight our 
ability to prioritize de dicto considerations.37 While I do not mean to present cases that are in fact 
fully analogous to any given non-identity case, I do wish to provide cases that will highlight at 
least (and sometimes at most) the relevantly related de dicto considerations of harm and benefit. 
Consider the following: 
De Dicto Relevant Cases 
College Fund: You and your partner begin setting aside money for your children’s 
education before you even have children. The individual identities of the children 
you have are irrelevant. What is relevant is that anyone who comes to fill the office 
of ‘your children’ has the opportunity for higher education, thus making things 
better for any office holders who become ‘your children.’ 
 
37 Both sets of cases that follow here are taken from an earlier article. See Haramia 2013: 253-254. 
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School Teacher: You are a schoolteacher preparing next year’s lessons. Suppose, 
as may often be the case, that you know neither the number nor the identities of the 
students you will have in the coming year. Suppose, in fact, that the administration 
has not yet even determined which students will be in your class. Nonetheless, you 
plan your lessons with the intent to benefit your students, whoever they might be, 
thus making things better for any office holders who become ‘your students.’ 
Leader of State: You are a leader of state faced with an important environmental 
decision. You could choose to sign on to a protocol that would require certain 
sustainability practices, thereby providing the future citizens in your state with 
better lives than they otherwise would have had. The alternative is to forgo the 
signing of the protocol and ensure that the resulting effects on the climate will have 
adverse effects on the future citizens of the state. You sign the protocol, thereby 
making things better for any office holders who become ‘future citizens.’ 
Cases like these have something in common. In all of these cases, we have agents who 
are responsible in some important and recognized way due to a certain powers they possess as a 
result of a role they have undertaken. That is to say, we have expectations for people whose role 
it is to better the lives of those who fall under their umbrella of responsibility. Because it is often 
not up to them precisely which individuals fall under this umbrella, we think that they ought to 
consider how best to benefit anyone who comes to fill the office of, say, ‘my child’ or ‘my 
student’ or ‘future citizens.’ If they ignore this responsibility, then we may say that they harm the 
office holders in the de dicto sense, just as Tess would harm accident victims if she failed to 
enact certain seatbelt regulations. 
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Take note that these de dicto concerns obtain in cases where there both are and are not de 
re instances of the moral subjects. Since in some of these cases the actual people who will be 
affected exist, there is the potential for de re harm to manifest alongside the de dicto harm. This 
would be a problem for Hare’s account, because he requires a lack of de re expression, which is 
too strong. This is not, however, a problem for my view, as I do not restrict the senses in such a 
way. I will return to this issue shortly, as it arises in the analysis of competing harms. For now, the 
point of the above analogies is to demonstrate that the de dicto considerations in these cases arise 
at a time before individuals come to fill certain offices—and therefore before de re considerations 
arise—and they arise from the type of responsibility that is also present in the Sarah case. The de 
dicto considerations are relevant because the responsibility is present even as the people affected 
are not present. This de dicto responsibility justifies our intuitions of harm and benefit. Thus, we 
may recognize that there are indeed cases that entail justified considerations of de dicto harm, as 
well as role-based reasons to morally prioritize these considerations.  
Note that when the responsibility criterion does not obtain, de dicto considerations often 
diminish in relevance. Consider the fact that, in our everyday lives, we harm people in the de dicto 
sense all of the time. This harm is usually morally permissible insofar as we do not stand in a 
relevant responsibility-relation to the persons who come to fill the office in question. Let us look 
at the following cases that I have deemed de dicto irrelevant cases. Note that this does not mean 
that they do not or could not have any moral relevance. Rather, I claim that the de dicto components 
of these cases are clearly irrelevant when it comes to moral decision-making, given the context of 
the situations: 
De Dicto Irrelevant Cases 
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Movie Theater: Imagine that there is a sold-out showing of a very popular movie. 
You are very excited to see this movie, so you arrive early. You do not sit in back 
of the theater, off to the side, in order to benefit those who come into the theater 
after you. Instead, you take the best seat. 
$20 Bill: You are walking down the street. No one is nearby when you spot a $20 
bill lying on the sidewalk. You do not leave it where it is for someone else to find. 
Instead, you pick it up and put it in your pocket to spend later.  
Pie: You are eating at a diner, and you order a slice of pie. The server tells you that 
you are in luck because that is the last slice of pie they have that day. You do not 
retract your order so that someone else may enjoy the pie. Instead, you order and 
enjoy the delicious dessert.  
Should anyone arrive at the diner after you, eager for pie, your decision to order the last 
piece of pie will entail a de dicto harm. You made it the case that whoever wants pie from the diner 
that day will not get any. Similarly, your decision to pocket the twenty dollars makes any person 
who would have spotted the money had you not picked it up worse off than that person otherwise 
would have been, for that person could have been twenty dollars richer. Likewise, you de dicto 
harm those in the movie theater. Anyone who arrives after you is forced to sit elsewhere than the 
optimal seat in which you yourself chose to sit. Yet, the de dicto harm—even if it obtains—is 
clearly outweighed by the fact that you have no responsibility to avoid harming the subjects in 
these cases, whoever they might be. To be fair, you would arguably de re harm the actual people 
in these examples as well because you make the particular individuals who end up harmed worse 
off than they otherwise would have been had you not acted. However, that this de re harm obtains 
is not itself reason to ignore the de dicto harm that also obtains. And, importantly, neither sense of 
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harm carries enough weight to matter morally in these scenarios, which entails that the de dicto 
harm is not relevant enough to factor in the moral analysis of these cases.  
It will be useful here to remember an important feature of harm itself. Harm does not by 
itself generate wrongness, and this is true for both de re relevant and de dicto relevant situations. 
Again, ‘harm’ as we are using it is not an already morally loaded term, though claims of harm do 
provide us with some reason to investigate whether the harm was indeed wrongful. Put simply, 
making someone worse off than she otherwise would have been is not always impermissible. 
Likewise, making some office holder worse off than an office holder would have been is not 
always impermissible. But when the responsibility criterion obtains, we can appeal to de dicto 
harm, and this allows us to analyze potential wrongdoing in non-identity cases in terms of harm, 
which we seemed unable to do at the outset. This renders the role-based approach morally useful 
for both non-identity cases in particular, and also for other, non-creation cases involving 
responsibility relations between agents and offices that moral subjects fill. 
The intuitions generated by the de dicto irrelevant cases might explain why Parfit takes 
issue with the type of solution I am offering. As we saw, Parfit posits a “general person”—which 
is akin to de dicto offices—and he states that, under TT, the general person matters only about half 
as much as actual—or de re—individuals.38 But he does not explore the claim that they should 
matter less, and he not only entertains the possibility that we should assign less weight to general 
people (or, to these de dicto concerns), he is also proposing a principle that assigns them a uniform 
weight and applies it across the board without first assessing whether certain factors could make 
the weight of de dicto—or general person—concerns more variable. Perhaps he is actually 
envisioning only de dicto irrelevant cases like the ones above as he entertains TT, for it is true that 
 
38 Parfit 2011: 220-21. 
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de dicto considerations often matter less, or not at all, in a fairly consistent way. However, this is 
not true for all de dicto relevant cases involving offices, positions, or general persons; and we 
should not treat all de dicto relevant cases equally. I have provided a criterion of responsibility that 
draws a clear line between the relevant and irrelevant cases and renders utterly unjustified the 
assumption that de dicto considerations simply matter less across-the-board. 
As we saw in Chapter One, much of the literature on the non-identity problem can be 
separated into either person-affecting or impersonal views. Person-affecting solutions require that 
the wrongness of the act stem from its effect on an individual. Impersonal solutions require that 
we choose the better state of affairs over the worse one, regardless of whom the act effects. Both 
come with problems. Person-affecting views generate the non-identity problem itself, because it is 
precisely the harm to an actual individual that is missing in non-identity cases. When these cases 
are formulated so that we harm individuals without making them worse off, we run into several 
entailment problems. Often these nuanced views entail that we wrongfully harm someone in cases 
that seem intuitively to involve permissible harm, or they entail that we are allowed to commit acts 
of intuitively impermissible harm.39 While each has its merits and drawbacks, the bottom line is 
that person-affecting views have substantial trouble solving the non-identity problem. Impersonal 
views, on the other hand, need not rely on claims of harm to individuals. However, such views 
famously tend to entail worrisome outcomes, and they fail to take into account the unique position 
of the agent.40   
This middle-ground approach suggests that we ought to assess states of affairs, but only 
insofar as we are assessing the states for office-holders in general. And unlike Kumar and Hare, I 
 
39 See Hanser 1990, Harman 2004, and McBrayer 2008, for example. 
40 That is, advocates of the impersonal approach must answer to the Repugnant conclusion and the Mere Addition 
Paradox (Parfit 1984), as we saw in Chapter One. 
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concede that the child born with a defect can make no personal complaint about being born. Such 
complaints seem to align these views too closely with a person-affecting approach and the resultant 
drawbacks of appealing to de re comparative harm. While my view has, at its core, a concern for 
moral subjects, it is importantly different from what Parfit had in mind when he suggested the 
PAP. My view is person-affecting not in our claims about who in particular has been made worse 
off, but rather in our claims about responsibilities over offices that persons will come to fill and 
the importance of recognizing the de dicto concerns that arise in these cases. Thus, I suggest it is 
most fitting to describe my and other middle-ground views as “role-based.” To decide on the 
wrongness of certain acts, we need not focus on the effects on either individuals or states of affairs. 
All we need to do is ascertain what agents’ de dicto responsibilities (and personal capabilities) are, 
given their roles, and then determine from that what they ought or ought not do. These role-based, 
de dicto responsibilities only arise when we stand in a morally relevant relation to offices that must 
be filled by moral subjects to be filled at all, and they may be assessed before anyone has filled the 
office in question. And my account of role-based responsibilities provides a satisfying solution to 
many non-identity cases without an appeal to contracts or to a too-vague account of partiality, as 
we saw with Kumar and Hare’s views. We may do something wrong when we fail in our 
responsibilities to generalizable others, even if these others cannot reach a state of rational self-
governance. And we need not be merely partial to those generalizable others under consideration 
either. Instead we must stand in a legitimate responsibility relation to the office itself in order for 
strong moral obligations to obtain.  
So, by comparing the de dicto relevant cases to the de dicto irrelevant cases, we can see 
that de dicto responsibility (or lack thereof)—not mere partiality or rational self-governance—
makes a moral difference. Clearly, the examples that have given rise to the non-identity problem 
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fall under the category of de dicto relevant cases because we are responsible in a relevant way to 
our children, future generations, etc., whoever they might be. This evident de dicto responsibility 
supports the claims that we ought to adopt a de dicto reading of non-identity cases, recognize those 
whose roles entail de dicto responsibilities, and posit wrong action when the resulting harm is in 
fact wrongful. Whether the harm is in fact wrongful will depend on the particulars of the given 
case, but that my approach allows for an analysis of harm renders it best-equipped to fully explain 
our intuitions regarding non-identity cases. But this view is not free of challenges. I turn our 
attention now to a few key aspects of my view in order to respond to what I take to be the most 
important concerns surrounding this sort of approach.  
3.4 IS DE DICTO HARM REDUCIBLE TO DE RE HARM? 
First of all, a critic might claim that, under this view, de dicto harm is simply reducible to 
de re harm. That is, when we feel justified in our appeal to de dicto harm, it is due to epistemic 
constraints, not metaphysical ones. We simply do not know who the actual individuals will be in 
the College Fund, Teacher, and Leader of State cases. But perhaps what makes the de dicto harm 
morally relevant is the result that actual individuals will be made worse off. For example, there 
will be some specific child who will either have a college fund or not, depending on the parents’ 
actions. Suppose the parents’ decision does not ultimately affect the identity of the specific child 
in this case. The harm in this scenario can very simply be cashed out in terms of later, de re harm. 
This de re harm, according to this critic, could be all that is morally relevant in the above cases. 
And if we need actual de re harm to ground the relevance of de dicto concerns, then we no longer 
have a useful approach to the non-identity problem. This is, of course, because there is no de re 
harm in non-identity cases. If all relevant de dicto harm is simply reducible to de re harm, and if 
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de re harm is absent in non-identity cases, then it would seem that de dicto harm must be absent 
as well.  
The concern, then, is the following. I claim that the harm in non-identity cases can be 
explained through appeal to de dicto considerations of a failure to meet one’s role-based 
responsibilities. I also claim that de dicto harm can occur without de re harm. However, it would 
seem that the only kinds of cases that could possibly illustrate de dicto harm without any eventual 
de re harm are non-identity cases themselves. So, perhaps I am presupposing the wrongness of 
non-identity cases in order to motivate my approach to the problem, thereby begging the question 
against the critic who does not agree that there is a problem in the first place. 
To see why this is not so, let us compare my claims with the critic’s. I claim  
(1) that there is wrongness in some non-identity cases,  
(2) that the best explanation for (1) is that mere (i.e., without eventual de re) de 
dicto harm can be wrong when coupled with our role-based responsibilities, and  
(3) that therefore in some cases mere de dicto harm is wrong.  
The critic will claim, to the contrary,  
(1*) that there is no wrongness in non-identity cases,  
(2*) if (1*), then mere de dicto harm cannot be wrong when coupled with our role-
based responsibilities, and  
(3*) that therefore there is no case in which mere de dicto harm is wrong.41  
Support for (2) may come through the rejection of other attempted solutions to the non-
identity problem, and the critic would presumably endorse this project, given (1*). I will grant 
 
41 There is a suppressed premise at work here; namely, that the only cases that could give rise to de dicto harm without 
de re harm are non-identity cases, given their essential features. I am willing to grant this, though I suspect that there 
may be viable counterexamples to this claim.  
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(2*). This means we face a decision between (1) and (1*). In the Moorean spirit, I now ask: for 
which do we have more overall evidence? I agree that I cannot appeal to (3) to support (1), because 
that would indeed beg the question. Of course, the critic likewise cannot appeal to (3*) to support 
(1*), and presumably would not. The critic must either find some reason to deny (1) that does not 
depend just on the denial of (3), or find some reason to support (1*) that does not depend just on 
the affirmation of (3*). This appears to be a difficult task for the critic, but I can avoid begging the 
question without similar difficulties. I do not appeal to (3) to support (1). Instead, I appeal to the 
widespread intuition that non-identity cases involve both harm and wrongdoing. Our widespread 
intuitions provide more overall evidence for (1), thus I can avoid the charge of question begging 
and transfer the burden of proof onto the critic to defend a highly counterintuitive claim. 
I also wish to highlight two other independent reasons to believe (3) in order to further 
challenge the question begging charge that stems from my reliance on the responsibility criterion. 
Recall the two sets of de dicto cases—the relevant and the irrelevant. If you agree that the harm in 
the first set is morally relevant and the harm in the second set is morally irrelevant, then we have 
some reason to believe that de dicto harm is not always reducible to de re harm, because any 
relevant de dicto harm is tied to de dicto responsibility. If de dicto harm is reducible to de re harm, 
then there is reason to think that de dicto responsibility is reducible to de re responsibility, and we 
have lost a useful way of describing the intuitive difference between the two sets of cases. As we 
saw, the responsibility criterion explains the moral difference between the two sets of cases, but 
the responsibility in either set is not de re responsibility. The agents in the two sets are not simply 
responsible only to certain actual individuals. In the first set they are responsible (for, say, 
providing educational benefit or a healthy planet) to anyone who comes to fill the office over which 
they are caretakers. And in the second set, the agents are not responsible (for, say, gustatory 
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pleasure or optimal viewing) regardless of the particulars of the individuals who experience the 
effects of their actions. This de dicto responsibility or lack thereof leads to de dicto considerations 
that do not appear to be reducible to de re harm, because the responsibility does not appear to be 
reducible to de re responsibility. If de dicto harm were always reducible to de re harm, then the de 
re harm in both sets of cases would be the bottom line, and there would be no need to distinguish 
the two sets of effects. But given our differing intuitions about the two sets of cases, de dicto harm 
and responsibility stand apart as means of explaining of those divergent intuitions. This is further 
evidence that de dicto harm is not simply or always reducible to de re harm. 
So, in non-identity cases, wrongness can arise from the de dicto harm borne by a 
responsibility-relation between an agent and an office that moral subjects fill. This is not just an 
ad hoc appeal to something that conveniently solves the problem I have set out to solve. I have 
provided independent reason to employ this two-place responsibility relation. Obviously, we can 
appeal our strong intuitions in classic cases that responsibility over offices exists. It seems as if 
parents have unique responsibilities to not only their actual children who actually exist now, but 
also to anyone who becomes their child at any time, regardless of actual identity. This is similarly 
true with safety officers, leaders, policymakers, etc. But we can appeal to more than widespread 
intuitions about such cases. Not only does it seem that these relations obtain, but it is also true that 
our ability to refer to them is indispensable for both common discourse and for acquiring moral 
knowledge. For example, without the concepts of offices, we could not have meaningful 
discussions about upcoming presidential elections, or hold workshops on how to become better 
teachers, or debate labor laws, or bestow championship titles, or engage in any number of practical, 
commonplace conversations. Given that our ability to refer to the offices of ‘president’ or ‘student’ 
or ‘laborer’ or ‘champion’—and not just to the individuals who meet these descriptions—is so 
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generally indispensable, I am justified in appealing to offices when addressing particular non-
identity cases. Furthermore, the two-place relation between office caretaker and office is 
profoundly useful in uncovering our responsibilities and thereby acquiring moral knowledge. 
Without it, we could not talk about any moral imperatives embedded in the roles of parent, 
president, police officer, judge, etc. We could only talk about actual individuals’ actions in relation 
to other actual individuals, and this would be deeply unsatisfying not only in non-identity cases, 
but also for all role-based discussions of responsibility, including those wherein the moral subjects 
exist and are filling certain offices. Thus, a denial of my appeal to role-based responsibilities over 
offices not only allows for highly counterintuitive responses to the non-identity problem, it also 
threatens the very structure of common moral and practical discourse. The same way that the 
success of mathematics is some evidence for numbers, the success of our office-discourse is some 
evidence for offices. And if we successfully talk about obligations to office-like entities, such as 
future generations or species (a point I will return to later), then this too is evidence that we can 
stand in responsibility-relations to offices and commit de dicto harms without considering de re 
harms. 
3.5 RETAINING THE MORAL WEIGHT OF DE RE HARM 
Just as de dicto harm is not merely reducible to de re harm, de re harm can have moral 
weight independent of related de dicto considerations. One might object to my role-based view 
through a supposed counterexample that purports to demonstrate an appropriate level of 
responsibility with inappropriate considerations of de dicto harm. Consider the following case: 
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Adoption: You wish to adopt a child and you go to an adoption agency. The agency 
gives you the choice to adopt one of two children. One of the children is blind, the 
other sighted. You choose the blind child, and she becomes your child.  
This may be considered a counterexample to my view because you have the opportunity to 
adopt a sighted child. This would arguably de dicto better the office of ‘your child’ because your 
child would not have to endure certain limitations. According to my view, then, you should take 
into consideration the de dicto harm of making your child a blind child, and you should adopt the 
sighted child. However, this does not seem intuitively correct. We do not think you do anything 
wrong when you adopt the blind child, in fact we might even be inclined to praise such behavior. 
So, is responsibility over offices not always a sufficient condition for the obligation to benefit the 
office of ‘your child?’ 
Let us examine this question by analyzing the Adoption case more carefully. Unlike the 
Sarah case, it involves persons who already exist. Like the Sarah case, no harm occurs to the 
person who comes to fill the office of the child in question as a result of filling the office, regardless 
of whether one chooses to adopt a blind child or a sighted child. In fact, in the Adoption case, you 
would likely benefit the blind child if you chose to adopt her, and this would be a de re benefit her. 
In the Sarah case, no de re harm occurs at all as a result of either decision. There is no one 
individual who is harmed in this case. However, in the Adoption case, you can harm a particular 
individual if you make a certain decision. Specifically, you can de re harm the blind child at the 
time of the action (by depriving her of a home) if you chose not to adopt her. The potential for de 
re harm is clear-cut here, whereas it is absent in the Sarah case. However, the obviousness of the 
harm is not yet enough to claim that it trumps de dicto considerations. For, as we saw in the other 
de dicto relevant cases, sometimes de re harm is present and it is simply not relevant.  
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In some of those other types of cases, we are able to consider immediately the de re effects 
of our decision. But the Adoption case is importantly different. The Adoption case would, for 
example, not be akin to the original School Teacher case, but rather to a case wherein a school 
teacher picks certain favored students to be in her class while leaving others out. In that case, the 
teacher is benefiting the office of ‘her students’ by putting in those she likes, but she might then 
harm the individuals she chooses to deny. Her de dicto considerations are importantly altered when 
they arise alongside her de re considerations. Likewise, we are not required to prioritize de dicto 
considerations of bettering the office of ‘one’s child’ when, at the same time, we have good reason 
to consider whether to benefit or harm a particular individual or particular individuals. Selecting 
actual individuals to fill an office or position carries with it moral considerations that differ 
importantly from non-identity considerations. But this challenge still leads us to an important 
point.   
 How we go about prioritizing de dicto considerations matters. It is not as if these 
considerations always trump any other moral consideration so long as the requisite responsibility 
is present, therefore de dicto responsibility is not always a sufficient condition for generating the 
obligation to increase the welfare of someone under your care. Specifically, we often should not 
de dicto benefit someone at the cost of de re harming another at the time of the action. If I 
drastically improve the office of ‘my child’ by murdering a rich person and taking all of his money 
(thereby gaining the ability to provide my child with all she might need to become successful), this 
would not be morally acceptable even though it prioritizes the de dicto considerations regarding 
the office of ‘my child.’ Anyone who fills that office will be benefited. Yet, I am not permitted to 
harm a particular individual in this way simply because I have a responsibility to benefit my child. 
Likewise, Tess should not be allowed to reduce the severity of automobile accidents by forcing 
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half of all drivers to drive no faster than 15mph. This unfairly harms particular drivers at the time 
of the Tess’ action. Returning to the Adoption case, you are, at the very least, allowed to take into 
account the de re considerations of the child you wish to adopt and of the child you ultimately 
reject.  
Similarly, benefiting those who already exist can outweigh the harm of bringing others into 
existence to benefit them. Suppose your choice was between adopting a blind child and conceiving 
a sighted child. Adopting the blind child may constitute a de dicto harm, because you are making 
it the case that you fill office of your child with someone who is (arguably) worse off rather than 
better off. Yet, given that the blind child already exists to be de re benefited, and given that de re 
harm or benefit for the non-existent child is not a factor unless it comes into existence, the de re 
benefit of adopting the blind child could presumably outweigh the de dicto harm of filling the 
office of your child in that way. If the de re benefit outweighs the de dicto harm, and if the other 
child is neither harmed nor benefited, then it is clearly acceptable to adopt the blind child rather 
than to conceive a sighted child (assuming you have the resources to care for such a child – a point 
I return to later in this chapter). Furthermore, if the blind child will not be adopted unless you 
adopt, there is important de re harm to consider, which could (depending on the extent of the harm) 
make it the case that you ought not conceive the sighted child when you could adopt the blind 
child. However, suppose you know that someone else will adopt the blind child and take just as 
good care of it as you would have. In that case, the de re benefit to the blind child is guaranteed, 
and it would again be morally acceptable to choose either option. The bottom line is that de dicto 
considerations are still situated within the greater nexus of moral principles, and de re harm and 
benefit still matter.  
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One might now think that the following is an unappealing implication of this view. Suppose 
you have no intention to conceive a child, but rather you wish only to adopt. You are at the adoption 
agency and you are choosing between adopting a child with a serious defect and adopting a 
perfectly healthy child. Suppose also that if you adopt the healthy child, the next couple who comes 
to the agency will adopt the child with a serious defect and care for that child exactly as well as 
you would have. The de re benefit to the child with the defect is the same no matter what you 
decide, but you have the opportunity to de dicto better the office of your child by adopting the 
perfectly healthy child, therefore, perhaps you have a moral obligation to do so. Yet, that you 
would have a moral obligation to adopt the healthy child in this scenario seems counterintuitive. 
However, my view does not entail that this is in fact a case of moral obligation. My view does 
entail that adopting the child with a defect would lead to de dicto harm, and that you as a parent 
have reason to prioritize this harm given both your role-specific responsibilities and the lack of de 
re harm. But harm itself—de dicto or otherwise—is not always wrong. I maintain that you have 
good reason in this case to consider the moral weight of this de dicto harm insofar as you are 
considering how best to fill the office of ‘your child’ according to your role as parent. In this case, 
however, it would be quite reasonable to conclude that the de dicto harm, as it stands, does not 
carry enough weight to generate the wrongness of incurring that harm. That you stand in a 
responsibility relation to an office that a moral subject will fill means that you have a moral 
obligation to weigh the de dicto harms that will result from your choices, but it does not mean that 
such harm will always generate wrongness. The particulars of a case strongly affect whether de 
dicto harm is permissible or impermissible. In this case, your responsibilities as a parent probably 
do not include the requirement that you avoid this de dicto harm, given how minimal this harm is, 
and given the assurance of de re benefit to the other child.  I claim that role-specific responsibilities 
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require that the agent prioritize de dicto harm in certain cases, but the prioritization itself does not 
automatically generate wrongness. It does, however, provide us with a viable account of harm to 
consider in non-identity cases—and in any cases involving responsibility-relations between agents 
and offices—and my view thus retains its value as an approach to solving the non-identity problem 
by uncovering morally relevant harm where there originally appeared to be none. This analysis 
does, however, lead to an important question of what the extent of parental (and other) 
responsibilities should be, and I will address that concern shortly. 
Returning to the original concern, the Sarah case and certain other de dicto relevant cases 
do not contain de re considerations of the type that we find in the Adoption case, or that we find in 
the case where you murder someone to benefit your child. In cases like the Adoption case, we 
should indeed weigh the de re considerations, but it is precisely this added weight that makes the 
Adoption case morally disanalogous to the Sarah case. Because of this, the Adoption case is not a 
counterexample to my view. It does indeed expose important limitations to the relevance of de 
dicto considerations overall, but these are simply limitations regarding the weight we should place 
on such considerations in the face of other moral considerations—and these are the kind of 
limitations that come with almost every moral principle. Nonetheless, when we have cases wherein 
the requisite responsibility obtains and de re harm does not occur alongside the action, we are 
justified in giving weight to the de dicto considerations. Since the original non-identity case falls 
under this description, we are warranted in appealing to our de dicto concerns regarding the office 
of ‘her child’ when positing harm. 
This analysis highlights one way in which my view differs importantly from Hare’s. Hare 
claims that we have a de dicto duty—or responsibility—when the interest we have in serving 
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certain groups has no de re expression.42 But this is far too narrow. We can have de dicto 
responsibilities even when de re considerations are present as well. Wasserman picks up on this 
problem in Hare’s work as he exposes what he calls a “critical” difference between cases which 
entail interests that have no relevant de re expression (Safety Officer, School Teacher, etc.) and 
those in which there is no de re expression at all (Sarah, Leader of State).43 He notes that, in the 
Safety Officer case, Tess intentionally creates a benefit and only incidentally affects who receives 
that benefit. On the other hand, the mother in the standard non-identity cases creates a benefit 
while intentionally ensuring that a certain individual will come into existence to receive that 
benefit. Wasserman seizes on this distinction in order to outline why a de dicto solution must 
grapple with the problem of a responsible agent who fills the office under his care with actual 
individuals who happen to already be well off while disregarding other actual individuals who are 
less well off. That this is a problem requiring a response can be seen in the Adoption case presented 
above. Sometimes our de dicto duties are not as morally salient as other duties.  
But both Hare’s and Wasserman’s analyses of these concerns are inadequate. We need not 
assume that de dicto responsibilities have relevance only when there is no de re expression. The 
School Teacher case demonstrates that much. And we need not throw up our hands when we 
encounter de re considerations arising alongside de dicto considerations, as we just saw. Let us for 
the moment return to the de dicto relevant cases I outlined earlier. In the School Teacher case, the 
act does not determine that certain individuals will come into existence over others. Instead, it 
determines what the (learning-specific) welfare level will be for the already existing individuals 
who will become that teacher’s students, whoever they turn out to be. In the College Fund and 
 
42 Hare 2007: 519. 
43 Wasserman 2008: 532. 
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Leader of State cases, the identity of the subjects is determined as a result of the act that affects 
the welfare of whoever fills the office of ‘future citizen’ or ‘future child.’44 However, this does not 
mean that these cases are on par with the original pregnancy case, and this disanalogy uncovers 
precisely why de dicto relevant cases are more fine-grained than Wasserman presents.  
Wasserman wants to draw the line between cases in which agents only incidentally affect 
the de re expression of the consequent welfare (Safety Officer) and those cases in which agents 
intentionally affect the de re expression of the consequent welfare (Sarah, or any standard non-
identity pregnancy case). But notice that the College Fund case and Leader of State case have more 
in common with the Safety Officer case than the Sarah case on this account. While saving for your 
children’s future and signing protocols can indeed determine that some individuals will come into 
existence over others, this determination is purely incidental—like Tess’ act—and not intentional, 
like Wasserman would claim of Sarah’s act. The larger point is this. We would not think that the 
moral status of the parents’ acts in College Fund, or the obligations of the leader in Leader of State, 
would change if we tweaked the cases to make their de re determinations utterly intentional—that 
is, if they actually intended to bring certain people into existence over others, rather than simply 
foreseeing that their acts would have this effect.  Furthermore, the Safety Officer case does more 
to determine the de re identity of the affected subjects than the School Teacher case, because Tess’ 
act determines—albeit incidentally—who is affected, whereas a teacher will often get the same 
students no matter how he prepares—he simply does not know who the actual individuals will be. 
Clearly, what matters most in all of these cases is not the particulars regarding incidental vs. 
intentional acts and existence vs. non-existence. What matters most are the de dicto responsibilities 
 
44 Though it is probably not guaranteed that the agents determine that certain individuals come into existence over 
others in these cases, let us feel warranted in stipulating that this is the case, given the good probability that such acts 
will have such consequences. 
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that these agents possess. And the specifics of a given role as office caretaker are crucial for how 
we compare our de dicto responsibilities against our de re responsibilities. Therefore, uncovering 
all of the fine-grained differences between the various de dicto relevant cases, while interesting, 
does little to challenge the role-based approach. We are, however, still left with Wasserman’s 
important concern regarding how responsible agents ought to fill the offices over which they are 
caretakers. 
3.6 A METHOD FOR WEIGHING HARMS 
There is an important concern stemming from the acknowledgement that de re and di dicto 
consideration are both morally important. I have argued that the responsibility criterion renders de 
dicto harm morally relevant while also maintaining that de re harm—where it obtains—has the 
potential to matter morally as well. Retaining the commonsense, counterfactual account of de re 
harm is useful because it neatly avoids many of the thorny problems that arise in nuanced, non-
counterfactual accounts of harm. We do not have to adopt an ad hoc or convoluted account of harm 
in order to solve the non-identity problem. We simply need to recognize that the commonsense, 
counterfactual account has de dicto components in addition to de re ones. But merely recognizing 
the two components still leaves certain questions unanswered. Specifically, is there a particular 
method by which we should proceed when both de re and de dicto concerns arise together? 
This question matters when considering cases—like the Adoption case—wherein the de re 
and de dicto components themselves generate conflicting prescriptions. Recall the Doctor case 
from the previous chapter: 
Doctor: A doctor is, for whatever reason, deciding which set of patients she is 
willing to take on. She may either take on very sick people and improve their health 
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significantly—though she will leave them far short of being fully healthy—or she 
may take on only minimally unwell patients and quickly restore them to full health. 
If she chooses the former, the office of her patients will have much higher welfare 
than if she chooses the latter, thereby seemingly satisfying her responsibility to 
avoid de dicto harm. 
So, de re considerations suggest that she ought to take on the sick people, and de dicto 
considerations seem to imply that she ought to choose the other set. Obviously, doctors have de 
dicto responsibility to their patients because their role is to improve the health of anyone who fills 
the office of ‘their patients’ (to the best of their ability). But this is consistent with the doctor taking 
on only minimally unwell patients, because she is filling the office of her patients with individuals 
with higher welfare, thus minimizing de dicto harm. However, this is clearly not the appropriate 
thing to do.  We seem to be missing some key factors at work in cases of harm. This is due to the 
fact that simply looking at the level of welfare—while ignoring progress—is often an incomplete 
approach. De dicto responsibility may require the agent to consider net welfare, not merely the 
level at which the welfare line is drawn. 
Let us say that 0 units of welfare is the point at which a patient is so unhealthy that life is 
not worth living, and that 100 units of welfare is the point at which a patient has reached full health. 
Suppose, on the one hand, that the doctor takes on patients who have 20 units of welfare and 
increases their welfare to 80 units. On the other hand, suppose the doctor takes on patients who 
have welfare of 95 units and increases their welfare to 100 units. The level of welfare is clearly 
better in the latter case. But the net gain of 60 units of welfare in the first case is surely a more 
significant improvement than the net gain of 5 units in the latter case. Given these considerations, 
a doctor who generates the most improvement in her patients is fulfilling her de dicto 
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responsibilities best, and this aligns nicely with our intuitions about what makes someone a good 
doctor. Thus, to suggest that de dicto responsibility entails that a doctor must take on patients with 
relatively high welfare is to misunderstand how certain office caretakers should measure the 
welfare of those who fill offices over which they have responsibility.  
Notice, however, that this appeal to progress cannot be made in non-identity cases. I 
concede, unlike Kumar and Hare, that the child has no personal complaint in the Sarah case, 
regardless of her decision. We are not able to compare benefits in the Sarah case because no 
individual is made better off than he otherwise would have been. In non-identity cases, the only 
available metric is the level of welfare. While looking only at the level of welfare in the doctor 
case is an incomplete approach, it is so because that type of case includes factors of de re progress 
and benefit—factors that are simply absent in non-identity creation cases. And the fact that 
progress concerns are absent in creations cases seems to make a moral difference. Intuitively, Sarah 
ought to increase the baseline level of welfare her child enjoys in a creation case by filling the 
office with a better off individual when it is easily within her power to do so, and intuitively the 
doctor ought to consider how best to make progress in the health and welfare of her patients, given 
her role as doctor and the fact that they already exist to be harmed or benefited by her decision. 
Progress is a factor when de re considerations exist alongside de dicto responsibilities, and it is not 
a factor when the case in question constrains our choice to either existence at one level of welfare 
or existence at another level of welfare. If, however, once Sarah’s child was born, she failed to 
take certain measures to contribute to progress in her child’s welfare, we might say that she has 
done something wrong. But determining whether a given act of benefit is morally required is a 
separate question, to which I now turn. 
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3.7 EXTENT OF BENEFIT 
When weighing de dicto harm against de re harm, we must consider the responsibility 
criterion, compare the harm (and benefit) correctly, and recognize that de dicto harm is not 
necessarily reducible to de re harm. Once we do this, we find that the obligations borne of de dicto 
responsibility correctly explain the harm and wrongness of certain non-identity-related actions. 
We have moral reason to better the lives of those for whom we are responsible in ways that are 
appropriate to the given offices over which we are caretakers. And we should think carefully about 
whether and to what extent de re considerations compete with de dicto ones. A doctor has a 
responsibility to make her patients healthier, but often the de re components of this responsibility 
will compete with the de dicto components, and this is why progress is the important metric in 
those cases. However, a mother has a responsibility to her child, but unless this child already exists, 
there are no available de re considerations that compete with her de dicto ones. So, de dicto benefit 
in accordance with parental responsibility is the important metric in these cases.  
But now we must ask to what extent parents are obligated to benefit the offices of ‘their 
children,’ for certain kinds of cases make it clear that the threshold should be something short of 
maximal. The first case of this sort raises questions regarding the limitations of the office itself, 
and the second involves the competing interests of the office caretaker. Let us start with the first 
kind of case. If a mother, like Sarah, is choosing between conceiving a healthy child and 
conceiving an impaired child, then both our intuitions and my view lead us to claim that she ought 
to conceive the healthy child. But what if there is no option for a perfectly healthy child? Is it 
simply wrong to conceive a child with a serious impairment? Consider the following case: 
Mrs. Robinson: Mrs. Robinson wants to have a child. She goes to the doctor and 
the doctor tells her that any child she conceives will become blind by the age of 
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eight. So, she can either conceive a child as planned – call him “Ray Charles” – or 
she can opt not to conceive a child at all. She conceives Ray Charles. 
Has she done something wrong by conceiving Ray, knowing as she does so that he will be 
visually impaired? Most intuit that this is not wrong, given that there was no option for her to 
conceive a fully functioning child. Any solution to the non-identity problem must contend with 
this kind of case, and, ideally, it will be able to account for our intuitions in both this case and the 
original case. My view is equipped to handle this challenge in the following way.  
While it is likely true that Sarah ought to conceive the healthy child, and though my role-
based view explains this prescription; Mrs. Robinson has no such responsibility. It is not that she 
is failing to meet a de dicto responsibility to the office of ‘her child,’ instead she is merely 
constrained by the limitations of her child’s office. It is impossible that she conceive a perfectly 
healthy child, and we are not beholden to impossibilities when considering our de dicto 
responsibilities. In the same way, we cannot be held responsible if we do not conceive only 
children who are wholly resistant to cancer—even though this would greatly improve the office of 
‘our children’—because it is impossible to conceive such children. Thus, the limitations of a given 
office are integral in our determination of what, as office caretakers, we ought to do.  
Other considerations can arise that legitimately temper the extent to which we are required 
to benefit those under our care, and this leads to the second kind of case that challenges the 
maximal threshold of benefit. While we cannot be expected to do the impossible when we are 
office caretakers, one might think that parents still have an obligation to do everything that is 
possible to better the offices for their children. However, this condition seems to be far too strong. 
Consider the following case: 
72 
 
Car Seat: Suppose you are a parent shopping for a car seat for your child. You have 
narrowed it down to two options, both of which are equally safe. There is a cheaper 
car seat that will be less comfortable for your child, and there is an expensive car 
seat that will be more comfortable. You opt for the cheaper car seat, so that you can 
spend the money you save on a fancy dinner.45 
While the best thing to do in the interest of your child’s welfare would have involved 
buying the expensive car seat, it does not seem that you act wrongly in this scenario, even though 
you fail to benefit maximally a moral subject who is under your umbrella of responsibility. This 
result obtains in cases far less trivial than the car seat one as well.  
Eugenics: Suppose you are planning to have a child through IVF. Suppose also that 
you are somehow able to ensure whether your child will be attracted to the same 
sex. Because you want your children to have the highest welfare possible, you 
instruct the doctor to implant only fertilized eggs that will not become same-sex 
attracted individuals, because you have good reason to believe that a heterosexual 
child will experience higher welfare, given the rampant discrimination against 
homosexuals in your society. 
This is just one fantastical example of many sorts of cases that could skirt the line of 
eugenics. If you have a responsibility to better the office of your child, and if you have good reason 
to believe that certain characteristics will lead to greater hardships, then you have some reason to 
avoid having children with those characteristics. The cases I have in mind here are importantly 
different from the original Sarah case involving a major medical condition. Medical conditions 
that severely limit functioning, life span, or quality of life are permissibly avoided in non-identity 
 
45 Credit to David Boonin for proposing this counter example. 
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cases when those sorts of problems are inherently limiting. But eugenics-type cases that involve 
merely social harms are not inherently limiting, they are contingently so. There is nothing in and 
of itself harmful about being attracted to the same sex. The harm results from reactions and 
restrictions that depend entirely on the individual’s social environment. In an ideally functioning 
society, there would be nothing harmful per se about being born homosexual (or female, 
interracial, intersex, etc.). Of course, one might think that an ideally functioning society would 
also provide as many accommodations as possible to ensure that those with limited functioning 
are not harmed by their state, in which case many medical conditions could be (and often are) 
merely contingently harmful as well. Setting aside the precise conditions for this distinction 
between medical and social harms, we can, at least superficially, separate medical harms that are 
inherently harmful from social harms that are contingently harmful and which stem from present 
injustices.46  
Clearly, social factors and science can and do collude to create harmful and unjustified 
imbalances of welfare. Yet, I reject the claim that we always have a responsibility to create those 
who will be most well off given the state of society, because this can reinforce and reproduce 
unjustified stereotypes and prejudices. We do have a responsibility to those we create, but we also 
have significant obligations not to perpetuate systematic injustices. I will return to this point in 
Chapter Five, where I discuss bioethical concerns about genetic manipulation more specifically, 
but for now this case is evidence that the role of parent does not entail the prescription that they 
must always (de re and de dicto) benefit their children maximally. They must also consider whether 
they are contributing to societal harms and injustices and weigh those considerations accordingly. 
 
46 Some medical disabilities carry with them contingent harms based on our excluding or stigmatizing the ability-
impaired. These would bring with them similar concerns regarding eugenics. 
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These points are also further evidence that my view is not an exhaustive account of morality, and 
that it ought not be so. Not all moral cases involve de dicto responsibilities, and not all of morality 
hinges on our recognizing such de dicto responsibilities. That my view cannot account for the 
wrongness of every impermissible act is no shortcoming. I aim to address here only what is harmful 
or impermissible given our de dicto responsibilities.  
I admit that many moral concerns have little to do with de dicto responsibilities, and I leave 
it to the other areas of morality not covered in this work to enumerate the wrong-making features 
of those cases. For example, suppose the Sarah case is tweaked, and that she does not know what 
will happen when she conceives now versus later. Instead I know that she will conceive a child 
with a serious defect if she conceives later, but not if she conceives earlier. I then slip her a pill to 
ensure that she does not conceive now, and that she conceives a child with a serious defect later.47 
I do not have the commonly recognized de dicto responsibilities borne of a parent/child 
relationship, because I am not the parent of her child. Thus, appealing to de dicto responsibilities 
cannot explain what is wrong with my act. But there are plenty of other, viable explanations of 
what makes my act wrong in that case. I certainly violate the mother’s autonomy, and I administer 
drugs without her knowledge or consent. And unless she would have preferred a child with a 
serious defect, I make her worse off than she otherwise would have been without just cause, 
thereby harming her in the de re comparative sense. And there may be even more features of my 
act that make it wrong, regardless of my lack of parent/child borne de dicto responsibilities in this 
case. Recognizing role-centered de dicto responsibility can indeed be sufficient to determine the 
harm in an act—and these harms are sometimes wrong, though the responsibility itself is not 
sufficient to determine wrongness—but this responsibility is not necessary in order for an act to 
 
47 Thanks to David Boonin for presenting me with this case. 
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be wrong, given the weight of certain other moral concerns not generated by de dicto 
responsibility. 
3.8 VOLUNTARINESS AND POTENCY 
Let us now look carefully at what, precisely, comprises the responsibility criterion. Given 
the above analysis, we can elicit two conditions within this criterion: (1) voluntariness and (2) 
potency. The voluntariness condition means that one should consent to or volunteer for the role or 
position in order for de dicto responsibilities to be generated. The potency condition requires that 
one must have enough power to effect the changes or benefits entailed by the respective de dicto 
responsibilities in order to be morally bound by those responsibilities. 
Why voluntariness? Consider the classic parenting cases. In these cases, the parents have 
decided to have children, thereby consenting to the responsibilities generated by that role. Suppose 
you have no intention of becoming a parent, but you open your front door one day to find a baby 
in a basket on your doorstep. Now, if you still have no desire to become a parent, then you are 
certainly not required to take on the responsibilities of parenting in this case simply because you 
have the opportunity to do so. You would, of course, have some very general de dicto and de re 
obligations toward this child (the details of such obligations I will discuss in depth in the next 
chapter), i.e., duties not to harm and to transfer safely to the proper authorities; but you do not have 
parent-specific responsibilities to this child precisely because you explicitly reject that role. 
Similarly, I do not have Tess’s responsibilities because I have not taken a job as safety officer, nor 
do I have the president’s responsibilities due (at least in part) to the fact that I have not accepted 
the job of president. I do, however, have responsibilities to my students whenever I agree to teach 
a class. We are able to choose our roles and professions in an important sense, and that we take on 
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our roles voluntarily is crucial for the generation of the ensuing responsibilities, both de re and de 
dicto, in many commonly recognized role-relations.  
When someone volunteers to take on a qualifying role, de dicto responsibilities ensue. 
Therefore, meeting the condition of voluntariness is at least sufficient for generating role-based 
responsibilities, assuming the legitimacy of the role itself. But is it always necessary? First, we can 
agree that either the condition is necessary, or it is not. If it is necessary, then anyone who opts not 
to take on a role will incur none of the related responsibilities. In this case, a soldier conscripted 
for service will not have any new responsibilities if he does not also assent to the conscription. 
However, the necessity of the voluntariness condition need not preclude the claim that sometimes 
we ought to accept certain responsibilities even if we do not in fact assent to them. Importantly, 
there may be other principles at work dictating when it is morally permissible to eschew a 
responsibility and when it is not. I will look at this idea in more detail in the next chapter when I 
discuss our general responsibilities to future generations. If, on the other hand, voluntariness is not 
necessary for the generation of responsibilities, then we may still think that moral agents have pro 
tanto general responsibilities—as, say, soldiers, or citizens, or community members—and that 
context will determine the extent of those responsibilities in a given case, and the extent to which 
they include de dicto responsibilities. 
The potency condition does similar work in generating role-related responsibilities. If I 
took on a role as office caretaker but somehow had no power to affect those who fill the office, if 
would be hard to see what my responsibilities might involve. Imagine a traffic officer who has 
been suspended from her duties. If she sees someone egregiously speeding, she does not (at that 
time) have the power to pull the speeding individual over and thereby lacks the responsibility to 
increase the safety of the others on the road. While it might seem trite to claim that we have no 
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responsibility to do what we cannot do, an important issue arises when we look at the gradations 
of power that office caretakers may possess. More power generates more de dicto responsibilities, 
and less power generates fewer responsibilities. I will return to this point as well in the following 
chapter as I discuss our responsibilities to distant future generations and to the environment, but 
the potency condition has short-term non-identity applications as well. Recall the Adoption case. 
Suppose you want to adopt the blind child, but raising blind children requires far more care and 
resources than you are capable of providing. If you manage to adopt the blind child in this scenario, 
you have failed in your de dicto responsibilities as a parent (as well as your de re ones). That is, 
you can best fulfill your de dicto responsibilities by filling a given office in certain ways. It might 
be better to adopt a blind child who already exists, but not if you are not able to care properly for 
that child.  
One might worry that this implies that poor or disadvantaged people ought not fill the 
offices of ‘their children’ because they do not have the resources to care properly for a child. That 
is, if they cannot meet parental responsibilities, then they ought not become parents at all. But this 
is too quick. Surely, if there are important needs that cannot be met, then one ought not 
intentionally bring someone so needy under one’s umbrella of responsibility. However, the actual 
features of poverty and disadvantaged status do not entail that important needs will surely not be 
met. Some poor or disadvantaged parents have extended-family networks in place that ensure that 
children are properly cared for. Furthermore, children born into poor families can, for a variety of 
reasons, end up with lives that have very high welfare levels. While there likely is a level of poverty 
that is so extreme that we can assume with a fair degree of certainty that parents having children 
under those circumstances are virtually guaranteed not to be able to meet their responsibilities, it 
is nevertheless important to note that there is not always a significant risk of low welfare for many 
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other poor parents. We might then assess what risks are involved in a parenting choice of this 
sort—and in all parenting choices, for none is risk free—but it would be deeply unfair to cast 
aspersions on poor parents simply because they are poor. And again, justice would require that we 
work to remedy any unfair social disadvantage that leads to poverty before we require a baseline 
level of welfare that the underprivileged will inevitably fail to meet, lest we risk furthering their 
disadvantaged status and committing egregious de re harms by perpetuating injustices.  
The point is that, unless a child’s basic needs cannot be met, parents are responsible for 
benefiting their children within the extent that their current position allows. It matters, then, what 
they can do—and here we see why the potency condition is crucial for generating responsibilities. 
Wealthy parents who do not set aside any money for education are de dicto harming their children, 
whereas poor families who cannot afford college in the first place are not making their children de 
dicto worse off than they otherwise would have been. Similarly, Sarah has a responsibility to 
conceive the healthy child because she can do so (and she can do so easily). Mrs. Robinson has no 
responsibility to conceive a fully healthy child because it is not possible for her to do so. 
In the next chapter, I look to related questions of large-scale non-identity cases that affect 
society in general. Procreation questions allow for very personal concerns, whereas environmental 
questions are often socially motivated. Many claims in environmental ethics depend for their force 
on proof of a successful solution to the non-identity problem. With such a solution in hand, I turn 
now to an analysis of our responsibilities to this much larger set of future people whose potential 
welfare is currently in our hands. 
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CHAPTER 4: FUTURE GENERATIONS 
Sometimes our responsibilities to society at large and our non-identity-related 
responsibilities to future persons are coextensive. That is, avoiding harm and increasing the welfare 
of future moral subjects is not always a personal matter of parenting or procreating. As we have 
seen, non-identity concerns may also be tied to the welfare of one’s society, and it turns out that 
both the welfare and identity of future societies can hinge on our treatment of the environment, 
resources, and public goods. Many think that we ought not make things worse for future 
generations. This is the central concern of various environmental initiatives and protocols. But as 
we unpack this concern, we find that the aim is not so simple. As I have shown, the referents of 
terms such as ‘future generations’ can be ambiguous, and claims of harm and benefit will depend 
heavily on which sense of ‘future generations’ we adopt. I have argued that, in non-identity cases, 
we ought to adopt a de dicto reading of ‘future generations’ when assessing what morality would 
require of us. But these large-scale non-identity cases carry with them their own set of concerns 
that must be addressed.  
In this chapter, I begin with a specific future generations case and apply my view as a 
solution. I then examine the differences in responsibility between these cases and simple 
procreation cases. The solution to simple procreation cases applies to a class of future generations 
cases that has parallel features. However, my view is precluded in another, more general class of 
future generations cases, and a separate analysis is required there. I turn to related questions of 
harm to the environment, ultimately dismissing certain accounts that are less well-equipped than 
my own. I tackle some of the more salient practical concerns that accompany our responsibilities 
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to the environment and to future generations. And I conclude that we have not only responsibilities 
to future generations given our respective roles, but that we also have a meta-responsibility to 
maintain certain sorts of roles, without which we cannot fulfill our obligations to future moral 
subjects. 
I begin with the assumption that we ought to avoid certain harms to future generations. Not 
all environmental advocates aim to do this, of course. For some, avoiding harm to the earth itself 
is enough generate obligations, and any benefit to persons is secondary, if at all important. The 
non-identity problem does not arise for these theorists, because this problem turns on the existence, 
or lack thereof, of future persons—not on the environment alone. But for anyone who is motivated 
by a concern for future generations, this problem is surprisingly resilient. Recall the Business-as-
usual scenario: 
Business-as-usual: We pollute the environment by intentionally not recycling, 
wantonly increasing carbon emissions, ruining the soil that grows our food, and 
using up our natural resources without regard for the future. As we do this, we find 
that our lives are full of ease, convenience and plentitude for several generations. It 
is also the case that the union of each egg and sperm that determine who exists in a 
given generation is very time-dependent. Such sweeping behavior will cause 
individuals to meet and couple at different times, creating different people than they 
would have otherwise. Thus, our acts are such that different people come into 
existence than would have existed had we not engaged in these practices. 
Unsurprisingly, after several generations, the welfare of the existing people drops 
precipitously because we have damaged the earth, radically altered the climate, and 
run out of many important resources. Yet, these future people have lives that are 
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still worth living. Importantly, their lives are worse than the lives would have been 
for the other people we would have had a hand in creating had we not engaged in 
the above practices. 
Would it be harmful to realize the Business-as-usual scenario? Intuitively, it seems that it 
would be—but why? As with the Sarah case, the referent shifts as we discuss the courses of action 
available to us. Of course, the future generations in the Business-as-usual scenario must live in a 
world without many valuable resources and conveniences on a planet that has been ravaged. Yet, 
if those who come into existence in a world stripped of most resources still have lives worth living, 
then this scenario is not positively worse for those people in particular. If Business-as-usual is not 
realized, these people do not exist. If they would prefer their existence over nonexistence—which 
we may assume most people with lives worth living would prefer—then they themselves are not 
harmed at all by Business-as-usual, because every bad effect they suffer due to environmental 
degradation must be compared to nonexistence. If they would rather suffer that bad effect than not 
exist at all, they have not been made worse off. Thus, they have not been de re harmed. On the 
other hand, ‘future generations’ denotes a completely distinct de re referent in the scenario wherein 
Business-as-usual is not realized. Those who would have been better off than the future 
generations who actually come into existence do not in fact come into existence and therefore their 
assumed welfare level carries no moral weight. While we would not de re harm them either if we 
made it the case that they existed, we also cannot consider them harmed if we do not realize 
Business-as-usual, because those who do not exist cannot be harmed. Furthermore, we would 
actually be benefited today by the additional creature comforts.  
No one in particular is harmed, and some people are benefited. Nonetheless, the claim that 
it is harmful to act in the manner of the Business-as-usual case can, in many cases, be grounded in 
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our role-based de dicto responsibilities to future generations. Such responsibility to generalizable 
others is clearly applicable to the sort of wide-scale decision-making one finds in these broader 
future generations cases. Suppose that I would not have existed had the founding fathers made 
different decisions that ultimately affected who was later born. As Ernest Partridge notes, I can 
still be judgmental about the decisions they did make—that is, I can be grateful for their adoption 
of the Bill of Rights and condemning of their failure to abolish slavery—even though neither 
decision made me in particular better or worse off than I otherwise would have been.48 Similarly, 
when considering the ways in which past generations have worked to maintain certain public goods 
for our generation, Annette Baier writes, “it was, presumably, not for this generation in particular 
that public spirited persons in past generations saved or sacrificed” (emphasis mine).49 Both Baier 
and Partridge recognized that responsibilities to future generations do not involve the sense that 
we ought to benefit any particular future individuals, but rather that we ought to de dicto benefit 
whoever will become part of future generations by making them better off than other generations 
would have been, to a reasonable extent. But this is notably a more general responsibility than, 
say, responsibility to one’s child or to one’s student. What exactly does such sweeping 
responsibility look like, and who actually possesses it? 
4.1 DIFFERENT ROLES, DIFFERENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
There are two important concerns regarding the claim that realizing Business-as-usual 
would be harmful because we have a de dicto responsibility to future generations. The first is that 
such responsibility is too broad to be morally compelling, which leads to a challenge involving the 
 
48 Partridge 2002. 
49 Baier 1981: 173. 
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scope of the voluntariness condition. The second involves infamous collective action problems. 
Let us begin with the first concern regarding breadth of responsibility.  
Practically speaking, is our responsibility to future generations too broad to be action 
guiding? The problem at hand extends well beyond prospective parents or safety officers. Those 
roles entail a comparatively small and far more personal set of moral subjects. And concerns 
regarding the broadness of our responsibility do not arise within the smaller-scale non-identity 
cases involving simple procreation. Parents who have accepted their roles as parents are clearly 
the most responsible for their children’s welfare, and they are also best situated to be effective at 
improving welfare. But whether one has responsibility to all future generations everywhere, or 
even just to one’s country, is a large-scale issue without a clearly delineated role. Do I myself have 
a role to play with respect to all of these future generations? And if I did, how could I ever take 
seriously such responsibility, given how ineffective I am at enacting large-scale positive change?  
In answer to this, I argue that one’s level of responsibility can and does vary in relation to 
one’s potency. Given the potency condition of the responsibility criterion outlined in the previous 
chapter, we can conclude that with great power comes great responsibility. With gradations of 
power, there are degrees of responsibility that one can bear to future generations, and these are 
based on how efficacious one can be, given one’s role in society. The more power you have, the 
more responsibility you bear to those under your care. Thus, political leaders and policymakers 
have a strong responsibility to future generations, given their roles. Political leaders qua leaders 
ought to care about their citizens in general (and not only about the citizens who currently exist), 
and they have far more power than the average citizen to effect change. Policymakers, too, must 
be very forward-looking by nature and must take seriously the predictable effects of various 
policies. A policymaker who paid no heed to the concerns of future generations would fail to meet 
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her job description. The roles of political leader and policymaker entail some very obvious 
responsibilities to avoid harm and even to benefit those affected by their decisions, and 
furthermore, the leaders equipped with this knowledge presumably accept those responsibilities 
whenever they accept those roles. Because these agents are aware that their jobs entail the power 
and potential for large-scale effects, and because their decisions will affect whoever fills the office 
of ‘my citizens’ both presently and in the future, these political leaders and policymakers have met 
the voluntariness and potency conditions and have a strong de dicto responsibility, given their 
assumed roles, to future generations—whoever they might be. 
Their political responsibility to these charges is clear, but it should also be noted that their 
responsibility does not end there. Because we live in an increasingly globalized world, it is evident 
that the effects of their actions are often not restricted to their individual regions and the respective 
citizens or persons therein. Therefore, their responsibilities should not be so restricted as well, and 
due to the potential widespread effects of their actions, a more global responsibility becomes part 
of the role itself. I am not suggesting that global considerations must always trump when global 
and local interests compete. What leaders ought to do in those situations will depend on the 
particulars of the situations and roles and should not be determined here in the abstract. I am merely 
recognizing that we are becoming increasingly equipped to predict how our actions and policies 
will affect people both across borders and in the further future, and I am claiming that considering 
these effects is now part of the responsibilities found in the roles in question.  
Evidently, then, leaders and policy-makers have strong responsibilities to future 
generations. These cases are analogous to the small-scale procreation cases discussed in the 
original formulation of the problem. Both the voluntariness and potency conditions have been met, 
and the ensuing de dicto responsibilities obtain. But can the same be said for cases wherein mere 
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individuals who might have neither the desire nor the power to effect sweeping change have a 
choice about how to treat the environment? To answer this, we must address in turn the scope of 
the potency condition and of the voluntariness condition. I will address the problems raised by a 
failure to meet the potency condition in a moment when I address collective action problems, but 
it should be noted that the voluntariness condition is primary; for without its being met, one’s 
degree of potency is of little importance, given that the agent does not assume the role in question. 
Certainly there are cases in which people today either cannot or do not want to do what is better 
for future generations. The voluntariness condition, if necessary, requires that the office caretaker 
willingly accept his position and the ensuing de dicto responsibilities. If this occurs, those mere 
individuals who willingly accept a sense of responsibility for future generations have moral reason 
to engage in environmental improvement. But this responsibility is importantly different from 
responsibility based on narrowly identified roles.  
It seems that one could just as easily decide not to care about the environment and future 
generations, and they would not meet the voluntariness condition. There is no narrower role-
relation between these unwilling people and future generations other than that they are all members 
of the moral community. Parents who have children cannot permissibly abandon all 
responsibilities to those children, and the same is true for leaders and their state’s citizens. This 
seems to be the case primarily due to the fact that they willingly took on these roles in the first 
place. For, an agent who decided to become a parent, but who then decided against becoming a 
parent before actually conceiving has not harmed their child in either sense—no de re child will 
exist to be harmed in that fashion, and this person willingly forwent the role that generates role-
based responsibility. In non-identity cases, abandoning (or refusing to take on) a responsibility to 
future generations does not entail any de re harm. And, as I have shown in the previous chapter, 
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de dicto harm may not carry significant moral weight even when coupled with a role-based 
relation. So it might appear that, in these cases, our de dicto harming future generations does not 
matter morally, as long as we do not explicitly take on the responsibility of caretaker for future 
generations. However, we can account for the impermissibility of the harm to future generations 
for reasons that lie outside of my view on role-based obligations, but which still rely on a sense of 
de dicto responsibility to persons more generally. 
There are some responsibilities that we ought pro tanto to accept. Commonsense morality 
often requires that we take on responsibility for other moral subjects in a very general way, even 
if we do not bear responsibility to them in a more commonly recognized role-relation, such as that 
of parent/child, teacher/student, leader/citizen, etc. Take, for example, Singer’s shallow pond case. 
If I happen upon a child drowning in a shallow pond, it is my responsibility as a moral agent to go 
in and save this moral subject, even though I stand in no particular role-relation to this child. What 
matters is that a moral subject is in danger, and I am in a position to help without sacrificing 
anything of moral importance. And this is a de dicto responsibility as well, because it is not the 
case that I must save her because she is a particular individual (though there are certainly de re 
benefits to saving her). I have a responsibility to save any moral subject I might pass by who is 
drowning in a shallow pond because I have a general responsibility to prevent harm to moral 
subjects when doing so does not impose significant costs on me. Importantly, if I keep on walking 
past the child and allow her to drown, I have done something morally wrong. But the wrongness 
does not stem from my failure to accept a role. The wrongness stems from my failure to recognize 
a general responsibility to act—responsibility that can sometimes generate de dicto harm absent a 
role-relation. Because the future generations will have the inherent attribute of being persons and 
thereby moral subjects, we as individuals do indeed have moral reason to accept a very general 
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responsibility to future generations, and this entail that we should often do what we reasonably can 
to prevent certain harms to them, regardless of their particular identities. Thus, the moral 
prohibitions on ignoring a drowning child and damaging the environment arise from something 
other than role-based responsibility. They arise from our general responsibility not to commit 
certain de dicto harms that arises from commonsense morality rather than a given role-relation. 
One could also argue that our increased knowledge about how and to what extent our 
actions affect the future generates moral responsibilities to future generations. Baier appeals to this 
epistemic facet of our relation to future generations when arguing for the claim that future 
generations have rights. Though there are serious challenges to the claim that non-existent people 
have rights, such challenges do not detract from her claims about the moral relevance of our 
increased knowledge. Those who participated in the industrial revolution did not know how 
damaging the effects of industrialization would be on future generations. Their lack of knowledge 
of the effects of their actions made it the case that they either (1) did not have obligations not to 
pollute or (2) cannot be culpable for their polluting actions. However we cash out this point, the 
fact remains that we are not now so ignorant of the effects of our actions, and we are thereby 
accountable, to the extent that our knowledge allows, for the effects of our actions on the future. 
And, as Baier points out, this accountability has nothing to do with the particulars of future people. 
Rather, it rests on the knowledge possessed by currently existing people, knowledge that includes 
the proposition that some future moral subjects will suffer—or enjoy—the effects of our current 
choices. Our job is not to ensure that any particular people come into existence. Our job is to make 
sure that whoever comes into existence is not de dicto harmed in ways that we can reasonably 
avoid.   
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The second concern regarding the claim that realizing Business-as-usual is wrong because 
we have a responsibility to future generations is the claim that, even when we have such 
responsibility, there is a collective action problem that prevents any one of us from generating the 
kinds of effects that will justify an obligation not to exploit or pollute the earth. Given my earlier 
claims about the importance of potency, one might note that, while I could be quite effective in 
saving the child in the shallow pond case, I might be far less effective in combating the harmful 
effects of climate change, resource consumption, and environmental degradation.  As we saw 
above, individuals do in fact have a moral reason to accept de dicto responsibilities to future 
generations. But does our inability to effect sufficient change preclude our responsibility from 
being strong enough to generate moral obligations? For example, suppose I have the choice of 
driving to the store or riding my bike. Of course, this would not qualify as a non-identity case 
unless this choice also caused some people to exist instead of others, but as I have shown, our de 
dicto responsibilities extend over many kinds of cases and are not necessarily contingent on 
creation of persons, or lack thereof. If I choose to drive, I will add a small amount of pollution to 
the atmosphere, but the effect of this particular choice on future generations will be negligible at 
best. Certainly if everyone chose to bike instead of drive whenever possible, the effect could be 
quite positive for the environment and for future generations. But I do not have enough power to 
dictate everyone’s choices. Thus, while I might have a de dicto responsibility not to harm future 
generations, any given action I choose to perform will probably not have an appreciable effect of 
harm (or benefit) on future generations, and I therefore seem to have no moral reason not to 
perform the minor act of polluting.  
This is a problem not only for non-identity issues but also for environmental issues in 
general, and it is a pervasive problem to say the least. Collectively, our actions have important 
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global effects and generate serious harms, but any individual act is often so causally weak that, in 
and of itself, it seems not to matter at all. To combat this objection, I appeal to a Norcrossian-style 
response to collective action problems.50 First, there is mounting evidence from climate scientists 
that environmental degradation and excessive resource consumption will impose very significant 
burdens on future persons in the form of coastal flooding, forest fires, erratic weather patterns, 
more frequent natural disasters, shrinking resources, increased risk of cancer and other diseases, 
etc. Thus, we should recognize that the harms that could be prevented by not realizing Pollution 
are in fact serious harms. We often believe that even small risks of serious harms are enough to 
justify moral obligations. This is why we think it is wrong not to buckle your child safely into his 
car seat every time you drive, and why we think it is wrong not to routinely check an aircraft’s 
safety features, even though the chance that these things would be used in a crash is so small.51 
Though the probability that your individual act will contribute appreciably to climate change is 
small, given the seriousness of the harms, we may be justified in thinking that it is wrong even to 
take that small risk by withholding contributory actions.  
Second, we can recognize that there is a threshold of environmentally sound actions below 
which there would be no relevant effect on the future and above which there would be a morally 
important effect on the future. Environmentally sound—or “green”—movements are growing in 
popularity, and people are recognizing the serious effects of our current behaviors. The importance 
of reaching and surpassing this threshold is becoming increasingly apparent, and the way to reach 
it is, in part, through individual action. Thus, even if your single action does not itself cross the 
 
50 Norcross 2004. In his famous article condemning factory farming, Norcross rejects the claim that causal impotence 
is an acceptable appeal when serious harms are at stake. This kind of solution, which I present a version of here, works 
well for solving many types of collective action problems. 
51 Norcross 2004: 233. These examples are taken directly from Norcross’ article. 
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threshold, you are shortening the amount of time it would take to reach that threshold every time 
you act in an environmentally sound manner, and this should be the aim of anyone who bears 
responsibility to future generations. Therefore, we should be concerned about de dicto harm to 
future generations (1) when we should assume responsibility in relation to the moral subjects in 
question, (2) when we are in a position to seriously harm future generations over whom we have 
responsibility, and (3) because the justification of minimizing this risk while aiming for the 
threshold is enough to generate the moral obligation not to realize Business-as-usual.  
4.2 THE OBJECTION FROM HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
Because my view can account for harm to future people, it can justify the intuitions of harm 
and wrongdoing we have when we encounter Business-as-usual. However, one might claim that 
the harm we do to the environment is sufficient for generating the wrongness of certain 
environmental policies, and thus we do not need to worry about how we harm the people involved. 
A deep ecologist or a proponent of the land ethic would be just such an objector. The deep ecologist 
would claim that the environment itself is the moral subject about which we should concern 
ourselves.52 The harm or benefit to persons is largely irrelevant, except insofar as these effects are 
themselves harmful or beneficial to the environment. Without the worry about how to account for 
harm to persons, the problem is not generated—or, at most, it is immediately clear where the 
wrongness occurs. For the deep ecologist, the wrongness arises from harm to the environment, and 
that harm is easy to point to in cases of policies that allow environmental degradation and increased 
climate change. Similarly, the proponent of the land ethic could easily account for the wrongness 
 
52 See Heidegger 1977 and Naess 1989, for example. 
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of a given policy by appealing to the resulting harm to the environment. Persons do not have 
automatic moral priority under this view either.53  
There are two ways to respond to these objectors. The first way is simply to accept their 
claims, but also to acknowledge that they would not carry much weight with anyone who agrees 
that there is a problem in the first place. If you encounter the non-identity problem of future 
generations, and if you are concerned about the conclusion that no persons are harmed, then simply 
pointing out the harm to the environment would do little to allay this concern. While there is 
certainly an argument to be made that the harm to the environment is important and ought to be 
taken seriously, this argument would not account for the fact that we also feel as if people are 
harmed. Without an explanation of the harm to people, all who found the problem compelling to 
begin with will still find it just as compelling.  
Another related response to this objection involves moving away from claims of wrongness 
while still questioning our intuitions of harm. Perhaps the deep ecologist or proponent of the land 
ethic does not find anything particularly wrong or alarming about the harm that is experienced by 
humans. Nonetheless, if they have the intuition that harm occurs at all, they should be troubled by 
the fact that the way to account for that harm is not immediately obvious. This is a concern about 
accuracy rather than a concern about morality per se, but my view is equipped to handle both.   
4.3 PRACTICAL CONCERNS  
A different type of objection to my view involves the practical problems inherent to the 
workings of the policies and states in question. Stephen Gardiner would argue that such problems 
 
53 See Leopold 1966 and Callicott 1990, for example. 
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remain even as we successfully remove the theoretical worries.54 He notes that climate change 
occurs neither immediately nor all at once. It is a resilient phenomenon that will continue to affect 
people as they come into existence, and will then affect who comes into existence. We know that 
many of the negative effects of our current actions on the climate will be deferred to future 
generations, whereas the present-day actors receive many benefits from our consumption of global 
resources. Furthermore, he asserts that we need not assume that all countries will look out for the 
best interests of their future generations in addition to the interests of their current ones. He 
concludes that we find ourselves in a tragedy of the commons. Gardiner thinks this tragedy is 
easiest to see if we consider a pure case wherein no generation overlaps with any other. In this 
way, all generations have a collective reason to want all other generations to conserve resources, 
however, no single generation would have rational reason to avoid, say, polluting and the benefits 
of polluting, given that countries will be biased toward their current generations.  
This tragedy, however, turns on two major assumptions, each of which is problematic. The 
first assumption is that countries will not care about their future generations. This claim is both 
cynical and not well defended. Even if some influential individuals and agencies within a country 
prioritize current generations, this is not to say that the current generation as a whole, its leaders, 
or its constituents are indisposed to care about future citizens. In fact, the problem of future 
generations is a problem precisely because we intuitively do care about how we might affect future 
people, and because many leaders and activists do understand that their roles involve such 
considerations. If, by and large, no one cared about future generations, then no one would take that 
aspect of the non-identity problem seriously. But we do take it seriously, and I would claim that 
we do so because we recognize (although not necessarily in these terms) our de dicto responsibility 
 
54 Gardiner 2010. 
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as leaders, or simply as stewards, to future generations. Part of why we care is that these future 
generations are a general set of moral subjects to whom we bear responsibility.  
Another important point is that there is in fact no definitive line between one generation 
and the next. We can often see the effects our actions have on future generations. This leads to the 
problem with the second major assumption that Gardiner makes. He assumes for the sake of 
clarifying this iteration of the tragedy of commons that each generation is discrete and distinct. 
Since generations are never in fact discrete or distinct, this simplification is hard to justify. 
Furthermore, it obscures the fact that we as humans, citizens, and members of the moral 
community care deeply about our children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc., and about the 
fate of moral subjects in general. This includes descendants we will know personally and those we 
will never know, and it includes those who will exist no matter our actions, and those whose 
existence is contingent on our actions. Again, we have a general sort of responsibility to these 
people, and this responsibility is relevant to the de dicto considerations that help us to solve such 
problems. Because of this fact, it is even less clear why we should make either of Gardiner’s 
assumptions at all, and we thereby have little reason to conclude that the intergenerational issues 
Gardiner posits will in fact result in a tragedy of the commons. Without the force of this problem, 
one might have trouble criticizing certain behaviors, given that many environmentally unsound 
behaviors will not lead to anyone being (de re) harmed. This helps to demonstrate why my view 
is so useful. Should we find that policymakers are unjustifiably prioritizing current generations, 
then my view provides moral reason to curb this behavior via de dicto considerations of harm to 
future persons. Even as corruption and indifference seep into the debate, the theoretical 
components of this solution equip us with moral grounding for our more practical aims. 
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Henry Shue points to a different and highly important practical problem concerning future 
generations. His focus is on fairness.55 Shue notes that rich, industrialized countries have become 
so by contributing to precisely the climate change and environmental degradation they now 
(professedly) wish to combat. Combating this would mean that developing countries—countries 
that did not get the opportunity to benefit from the initial boom of industrialization—would be 
prevented from employing similar means to increase their wealth and welfare. This seems unfair 
and thereby wrong, given the assumption that radical inequalities are unjustified. Shue argues that 
developing countries should not have environmental restrictions imposed upon them until they are 
guaranteed the means to a specific, minimal level of welfare.  
According to Shue, then, it would not be wrong for developing countries to de dicto harm 
future generations because the unfairness trumps the harm. However, Shue does not give a 
principled argument as to why, in any given case, considerations of fairness and equality trump 
competing considerations of harm. Without such an argument, and with my defense of the claim 
that de dicto harm does in fact occur, we are left without a positive reason to adopt Shue’s 
conclusions. Nonetheless, I do think that he raises considerations of fairness that are pro tanto 
extremely important. By making the case that claims about radical inequalities do indeed carry 
some weight, Shue provides us with very good reason not to dismiss these claims out of hand. As 
I have stated, de dicto responsibilities are still situated within the greater nexus of moral principles. 
Thus, a practical solution to the problem should take very seriously both harm and the unfairness 
that together constitute a large portion of the moral concerns involved in welfare considerations of 
future generations. Added to these is the concern for the environment itself, outlined above. Given 
the power and efficacy contained within those roles, a morally responsible leader or policymaker 
 
55 Shue 2010. 
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should be motivated by a concern for de dicto harm to persons, by considerations of fairness, and 
by the imperative that we take seriously any obligations to the environment in and of itself.  
Importantly, without an account of de dicto responsibility, a leader or policymaker would 
have moral reason to be motivated by unfairness and environmental harm, but not by the harm to 
future persons. Nonetheless, we feel intuitively as if this harm occurs. My view allows us to retain 
this intuition and also strengthens the moral sanctions against policies that would allow further 
climate change, environmental degradation, and harm. The implications of this are highly 
important, both theoretically and pragmatically. My solution provides theoretical grounding for 
person-based claims of wrongness with regard to these environmental decisions—a grounding that 
had appeared to be lacking in significant ways, due to the force of the non-identity problem. And 
this foundation is important in a practical sense as well because we have, prima facie, a strong 
aversion to harming moral subjects when harm can easily be avoided. If policymakers can 
justifiably appeal to this aversion when rejecting environmentally harmful policy decisions, then 
the argument for the morally correct policy becomes significantly more persuasive in a practical 
sense while at the same time increasing its theoretical integrity.  
4.4 OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN CERTAIN ROLES AND OFFICES 
When the roles of these leaders and policymakers entail responsibilities to future subjects, 
it is clear that we ought to assess their leadership based on how well they fulfill their respective 
responsibilities. However, if there is no leadership role, or if the role were somehow eliminated, 
then the relevant responsibilities would likely not be met. Thus we must ask ourselves not only 
what the relevant responsibilities are for a given role, but also which roles ought to exist or be 
maintained in the first place. 
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The existence of many roles depends heavily on the state of the society in question. The 
acceptance of roles facilitates de dicto responsibilities. Yet, what if there is no role to accept? If a 
role disappears or is threatened, de dicto harms could ensue (as could other harms). If these harms 
could be wrongful harms, then we are left with a worrisome scenario. For example, the role of 
EPA chief brings with it various important responsibilities to future generations. Now, we can and 
should question whether a given chief is fulfilling these responsibilities appropriately. But there is 
a further imperative at work. If, say, the president were to wipe out the entire agency, then the role 
of EPA chief would not exist anymore.  Without that role, we lack agents who are equipped to 
meet the related responsibilities. This could easily cause future generations to be worse off than 
future generations otherwise would have been, which constitutes a de dicto harm to future 
generations. Thus, to allow for the elimination or disintegration of certain roles may constitute a 
moral failing. That this is so should be clear, but it also raises an interesting question. While we 
might wrongfully harm future generations by eliminating crucial roles, are we at the same time 
obligated to benefit them by creating roles that do not yet exist that will be filled by individuals 
who bear even more responsibilities to future generations? That is to say, are all the roles that 
ought be actualized currently being actualized? 
This is a very difficult question. We ought not ground the wrongness of failing to create 
certain roles in the de dicto harm that will result. Not only would it seem to involve circular 
reasoning for those cases where we intuit wrongful harm, it would also have to include cases in 
which the de dicto harm seems irrelevant (because we would not yet have the responsibility-
relation in place to determine whether the harm is de dicto relevant or de dicto irrelevant). We can, 
however, assess whether we ought to create certain roles in light of other guiding principles—such 
as the aims of reaching justice or avoiding gratuitous harm—in consideration of a more 
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comprehensive morality that does not focus only on de dicto responsibility.  The answers will 
depend in large part on the particulars of the society in question. If a society already collectively 
maintains environmentally sound practices, then there is probably no need to create the role of 
EPA chief, because the related moral concerns are not raising moral issues, though not because 
these concerns are not moral, importantly. If, however, a society refused to establish the role of, 
say, stamp collector, then the related concerns of stamps being left to deteriorate are not morally 
motivated, and there is likewise no need to create that role (though there is probably no need to 
mandate that it is not created either). This would not be a case of a responsibility-relation between 
a moral agent and a moral subject; rather it would merely be a responsibility relation between a 
collector and a collection of inanimate objects. 
We can think about which moral concerns are salient in a given society, and ask whether 
current caretakers qua moral agents are, in particular cases, obligated merely to avoid harm, or if 
they are also obligated to provide certain benefits. If a role already exists, then maintaining it will 
often entail avoiding harm, because extinguishing the vector for a given de dicto responsibility to 
future generations could mean that that responsibility cannot be met and the future generations 
will be worse off than future generations otherwise would have been. So, if the role should exist, 
then extinguishing it may involve some wrongful harm. Baier thought it was simply obvious that 
every generation has an obligation to leave “as much and as good” of the public good as it has 
received.56 This is fairly uncontroversial, and my view allows for an explanation of why this 
comparative de dicto harm (leaving future generations worse off than we could have left them) is 
wrong. Yet the boundaries of our obligation to benefit future generations is less clear. I entertained 
some serious challenges to the claim that we have an obligation to benefit maximally those under 
 
56 Baier 1981: 175. 
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our umbrella of responsibility in the previous chapter, and a clearly delineated threshold of 
required benefit seems hard to come by. Creating roles that do not currently exist will in all 
likelihood entail a positive benefit (if the agent in question performs her role properly) because it 
will make future generations better off than future generations otherwise would have been. 
Sometimes this will seem supererogatory. If we sacrifice much of our welfare so that future 
generations can enjoy drastically higher welfare than we ourselves did, then this would probably 
be above and beyond the call of moral responsibility. But benefits to future generations cannot 
always be merely supererogatory. Suppose no roles existed that brought with them responsibilities 
to future generations. Any role created involving de dicto responsibilities would likely generate a 
positive (albeit potentially merely de dicto) benefit to future generations. But, intuitively, if there 
were no roles in place, then the benefits incurred by creating at least some qualifying roles would 
be obligatory. Therefore, we have some obligation to benefit future generations in addition to 
avoiding harm. The precise level of benefit must depend on the state of society and on the nature 
of the roles that already exist. Whatever the case, there is some threshold of welfare below which 
future generations ought not fall if we are properly meeting our responsibilities. This means that 
current people have a meta-responsibility to create and/or maintain the roles that will enable us to 
fulfill our general moral responsibilities.  
In addition to creating and maintaining certain roles, we must ask whether we have a 
responsibility to create or maintain certain offices. This question is especially important at the 
species-level, and is becoming increasingly so given technological, medical, biological, and 
environmental developments. In the next chapter I examine the ways in which our actions might 
affect future subjects at the species level, and I examine de dicto considerations regarding non-
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human animal species, the human species, companion animals, and species raised for 
consumption. 
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CHAPTER 5: SPECIES 
There is no single, agreed-upon definition for the term ‘species.’ Species boundaries have 
been carved out in a myriad of ways—in terms of the ability to interbreed, in terms of ecological 
niches, phylogenetically, genetically, and morphologically, to name a few.57 There is at the same 
time an important debate concerning whether species boundaries are real or mere conventions. 
Those who use divergent definitions are often doing so because they are working on particular 
projects that are best approached with one definition rather than another. For our purposes, we 
need not settle these debates. A very general and loosely sketched approach to defining species 
will suffice. I will use the term ‘species’ as a sort of catch-all that refers to a group of organisms 
who share some relevant features as well as common goals—a sort of natural kind. As such, my 
discussion of species could apply to subspecies, genera, and other groupings, but I will use the 
term ‘species’ for simplicity’s sake, and, importantly, because discussions in species ethics often 
proceed in terms of responsibilities to generalizable others. What I want to focus on primarily is 
the office-like nature of these groupings, the parallels between species discourse and moral 
discourse, and the idea that our actions can affect which individuals fill a certain office of species 
or kind.  
 
57 See, for example, Sandler’s analysis of these boundaries for further details. Sandler 2012. 
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5.1 MORAL WORTH 
The most important aspect of this use of the term ‘species,’ for my view, is that moral 
subjects come to fill such offices. Throughout this work I have made reference to responsibility 
relations that obtain between moral agents and offices that moral subjects fill. Moral agents are 
those beings who can reason about morality and act according to that reasoning. Moral subjects 
are those beings for whom it matters morally how they are treated. It is uncontroversial to claim 
that all moral agents are also moral subjects. For all those who can reason about morality, it matters 
morally how we treat them. It is also not difficult to argue that there are many moral subjects who 
are not at the same time moral agents. For example, most would agree that dogs do not reason 
about morality. Nonetheless, it is equally clear that it matters morally how we treat dogs. Similarly, 
some severely mentally disabled people cannot reason about morality, and it nonetheless matters 
morally how they are treated. However, that moral subjects fill a species-specific office is not the 
only morally relevant factor when considering how we ought to treat them. Another morally 
relevant factor is whether the species itself has moral status independent of its constituents. For 
example, we might think that stepping on an individual ant is generally not a matter of moral 
concern, but we might at the same time think that the species Camponotus americanus (a species 
of carpenter ant) has moral worth, and that an analysis of whether to extinguish the species may 
treat the species itself as a moral subject. I will argue that a view centered on roles and de dicto 
responsibility is better equipped to grapple with the moral questions raised by species-specific 
issues. 
First of all, a role-based view carries significant advantages over rights-based views when 
assessing moral questions surrounding species ethics. There are clear parallels between a species 
ethics critique of rights-based views and the ones found in the non-identity debate. Non-existent 
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entities are not the kinds of things that can have rights, because they are not the kinds of things 
that can possess interests. In the same way, while individual members of a species may have 
interests, a given species is not, on the whole, the kind of thing that can possess interests. Because 
the generation of rights is reliant on respect for an individual’s interests, the inability of species to 
possess interests renders many rights-based views inadequate for assessing moral questions 
regarding species. Of course, we should not take this to mean that there are no morally relevant 
questions in the discussion of species, or that all of species morality must be reducible to questions 
about individual members of species, just as we ought not assume that there are no morally relevant 
questions regarding future moral subjects who do not exist. If this were so, then appealing to 
individual animals’ rights would tell us nothing about why we should treat endangered species 
more carefully than non-endangered ones. This itself is evidence that a more complete approach 
to species ethics is needed—one that goes beyond the rights of individual members. Just as a role-
based approach uncovered morally important factors in non-identity cases involving persons, so 
too can it uncover morally important factors in cases involving the creation, continuation, and 
extermination of species comprised by moral subjects or constituting a morally valuable class for 
which it matters morally how we treat it. 
While there are clear parallels between rights-based concerns about classic non-identity 
cases and species-specific cases, there are also clear non-identity applications within species-
specific cases, given that sometimes our actions can determine both how and whether certain 
species exist. It seems intuitively correct to claim that we have some pro tanto reasons not to 
decrease the welfare of species or extinguish them altogether, even if those members of the species 
who would have been better off never exist. So, why do we have these obligations to species? Joel 
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Feinberg appeals to our role as steward—or caretaker—for animals and species as an answer.58 
This is a role-based answer to the question of what grounds our obligations to animals qua species. 
Given our roles as stewards, we bear certain responsibilities to species. Yet, according to Lilly-
Marlene Russow, this role-based approach begs the question. She takes the central question to be: 
why are species worth protecting? She does not disagree that they are worth protecting, rather, she 
wants to challenge the idea that pointing to a caretaker relationship can establish the worth of the 
subject in that relationship. Because caretakers are tasked with protecting that which is worth 
protecting, we have not yet answered that central question. Caretakers take care of those worthy 
of care, but how do we know whether a given species is worthy of care? The relation itself does 
not garner worth for the subject, according to Russow. While I agree that this approach as stated 
cannot establish the worth of subjects, this does not undermine the approach itself. That is, for our 
purposes, the worth of the subject might not be the central question. 
In most cases that we have been discussing, the subject clearly has moral worth. The 
parent/child, doctor/patient, leader/citizen relations all have moral agents standing in responsibility 
relations to offices that will be filled by what are undoubtedly moral subjects. These sorts of 
relations generate clear responsibilities on the part of the agents, the particulars of which are 
determined by the role the agent has taken on. So what happens when the moral status of the 
subject itself is in question? At first glance, one might think that species have moral status insofar 
as they are comprised by individual moral subjects, e.g., the species Orcinus orca, or the species 
Homo sapiens. Yet, this does not tell us why species with less clear individual moral subjecthood 
might still be worth our moral concern. The moral considerations relevant to an act of, say, 
 
58 Feinberg 1978.   
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stepping on an individual ant expose very little about what is morally relevant about the extinction 
of the species Camponotus americanus.  
Other attempts to answer questions about the moral status of species rely on claims about 
the value of species. Appeals to both intrinsic value and extrinsic value have been made toward 
this end.  Species have extrinsic worth when they are instrumental in bringing about some good 
end. Honeybees have extrinsic worth at least partially because the existence of the various species 
of honeybee allows certain ecosystems to function normally through the pollination activities 
performed by the bees. Nonetheless, can extrinsic value sufficiently ground moral status for 
species? One problem with this approach, as noted by Russow, is that it presupposes a natural 
order that is both static and good.59 However, there is not sufficient reason to suppose either of 
these things. To do so would not only ignore the dynamic nature of ecosystems, it would also 
commit the naturalistic fallacy. That a certain ecosystem functions a certain way does not mean 
that it ought to function only in that way, or that all changes to the ecosystem matter morally. 
Similarly, appeals to the extrinsic value of diversity are insufficient, because diversity alone is not 
always optimal or even desirable. Perhaps, then, an appeal to intrinsic worth can ground the moral 
status of those species with questionable moral worth.  
Species can have intrinsic worth in virtue of the value inherent to members belonging to 
the species. Whether and to what extent species have intrinsic value is a rich and interesting 
analysis that deserves more space than I can afford it here. But there is one recurring problem with 
this view that is worth mentioning. It is extremely difficult to devise a non-arbitrary metric for 
determining which species have intrinsic value, which do not, and the degree of value that the 
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value-bearing species possess.60 Assuming that intrinsic value is not always uniform in degree and 
kind, admitting that a species has value does not itself convey just how much value it has, or the 
particulars of the value. Because of this, appeals to intrinsic value are not equipped to provide us 
with much guidance when it comes to moral decision-making in particular cases involving 
particular species.  
Can a role-based view of de dicto responsibility better answer this question of worth? By 
no means do I think such a view can settle the question of whether and to what extent species have 
worth, but it can nonetheless provide us with a useful method for addressing the question. Because 
this view shifts the focus away from the subject—a given species, in this case—and onto the agent, 
we are able to assess both the moral importance of extrinsic value and the moral importance of 
intrinsic value when making determinations about a given case. Standing in a responsibility 
relation to a species with extrinsic value can generate moral obligations. If the destruction of an 
ecosystem led to significantly more harm than maintaining it, and if the extinction of a species 
would bring about the destruction of that ecosystem, then we have a pro tanto moral reason not to 
bring about the extinction of the species insofar as our actions affect its existence. Preserving 
certain species and thereby certain ecosystems can cause both future members of the species and 
future human generations to be better off than other members otherwise would have been, and this 
matters morally. 
So, even if we cannot use a role-based view to determine the intrinsic moral worth of 
species in borderline cases, we can use it as a general approach to questions in species ethics. 
Feinberg relies on role-based considerations for his analysis, but he claims that our responsibilities 
to future human generations are actually weaker than our duties to preserve non-human animal 
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species, given our roles of stewardship with respect to the world as a whole. His “inclination is to 
seek an explanation in terms of the requirements of our unique station as rational custodians of the 
planet we temporarily occupy.”61 However, this relation does not seem to be a question of weaker 
duties versus stronger duties. Not only are our obligations to future generations and our obligations 
to species often coextensive, but also it is also true that the role of steward to the planet will, in 
almost all cases, entail our obligations qua stewards to both future generations and future species.62 
Preserving and improving the planet is precisely the sort of aim that that those standing in a 
responsibility relation to future persons and future species should have, because that goal will 
typically serve to benefit humans and non-human animals alike who will inhabit the planet in the 
future.  
Clearly, then, my view of roles and de dicto responsibilities can provide valuable insight 
into the question of whether we have moral obligations to species with extrinsic value. 
Additionally, it is not at all hard to argue that we have moral obligations to species with intrinsic 
value as well, given that beings with intrinsic value clearly possess moral worth to some degree or 
another. And if it is true that a species has intrinsic value, then a responsibility-based view provides 
a means by which we can assess our obligations to that species on the whole, without appeals to 
the individual members—a means that is unavailable in other approaches that rely on such factors 
as the rights or the rationality of the individual. So, while my view is not by itself equipped to tell 
us precisely what value species have, it is equipped to guide our decision-making with respect to 
species that in fact have value.  
 
61 Feinberg 1978.  
62 If humans at some point left planet earth, then such concerns would not generate coextensive obligations, but I set 
that prospect aside, as it is not particularly relevant to the discussion at hand. 
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Questions of value also lead to an important parallel between species and offices more 
generally. While neither species themselves nor offices themselves have interests or rights as they 
are commonly construed, they are both the kinds of things that can contain moral subjects who 
possess worth by virtue of their manifesting certain descriptions. If a species has value, then we 
may assess our moral responsibility over that office, and we may assess the weight of any de dicto 
harms or benefits we knowingly cause. When addressing the morality of species-specific cases, 
we can draw on the de dicto nature of the role-based responsibility view in order to sidestep 
concerns that require us to restrict interests and rights to individuals. While neither species nor 
offices have rights, they may generate moral worth, and we can rely on this worth to ground the 
responsibility to act in certain ways.  
Of course, this worth comes from the stipulation that the individuals who comprise a 
species or office are moral subjects, so the parallel admittedly does not tell us how to delineate 
moral worth. Nonetheless, insofar as species have moral worth, de dicto moral considerations 
follow for those agents who stand in responsibility relations to these species. Furthermore, that we 
talk of species on the whole in ways that cannot be reduced to talk of individual members of the 
species is itself parallel to the way in which we talk of future generations or future children without 
having to reduce our claims to a discussion of actual individuals. The generalizable nature of these 
referents is indispensable for much of species discourse, and I claim that we need only ask whether 
the species or subjects have moral worth—and not whether some particular individuals or others 
will fill the office. And what matters most in many cases is that future office holders meet the 
description of moral subject. For that reason, I will focus my inquiries for the rest of this chapter 
on cases involving subjects who are widely agreed to be moral subjects, and the species-scale 
questions that arise from those relations.   
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5.2 HUMAN BEINGS 
It is fairly clear that not only are individual human beings moral subjects, but also that what 
we may owe to individual members of the human species is not always coextensive with what we 
may owe to the species as a whole, especially when we are thinking about the future. For example, 
perhaps we should not condemn individuals’ personal decisions to have children, but we may also 
owe it to the species as a whole to curb population growth insofar as it leads to harms via 
overpopulation.  
Of course, human beings are not the only species with moral worth, given very compelling 
arguments against speciesism.63 Nonetheless, Homo sapiens is among the set of species that have 
moral worth for reasons other than their species membership. So, let us turn to an exploration of 
what we owe to human beings more generally. That is, insofar as our actions predictably harm or 
benefit the species as a whole, what are our moral obligations? Not all role relations generate the 
same prescriptions. The particulars of a parent’s responsibilities differ from the particulars of a 
safety officer’s responsibilities, which differ from the particulars of a president’s responsibilities, 
and so on. Some responsibility relations (like that of doctor/patient) permit more de dicto harm 
than others (like that of president/future citizens). In the same vein, standing in a responsibility-
relation to your individual child generates different obligations than those generated by standing 
in a responsibility-relation to the human species. We can stand in responsibility-relations to many 
different offices, and the scale of our effects can determine the particulars of our responsibilities.  
These wide scale concerns arise often in the study of bioethics, and they result in an 
important debate about parents’, doctors’, and policymakers’ responsibilities to not only individual 
 
63 See, e.g., O’Neill 1997 and McMahan 2002 & 2005. 
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children and patient-type offices, but also to humanity writ large. Let us consider what they owe 
to the human species insofar as they are in control of the characteristics the future persons will 
come to possess. Advances in reproductive technology have enabled precisely such capabilities, 
and they hold promise for an even greater ability to dictate the makeup of future human beings. 
The ability to predict not only diseases and defects but also genetic traits is becoming increasingly 
likely, given medical advancements in gamete manipulation and in mapping and the full genetic 
blueprint of fetuses. If humans are someday able both to predict children’s traits and to decide who 
actually exists in light of those predictions, then some people will have the ability to affect 
intentionally the trajectory of the human species. Of course, many such cases will involve no de 
re harm, but, as I have shown, de dicto harm is still morally relevant in just these sorts of cases. 
Immediately, this raises concerns regarding eugenics that stem from practices such as 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, in-vitro fertilization, and selection for designer genes.  
Notably, eugenics in a basic sense is not always automatically impermissible. Recall the 
discussion of the Eugenics case in Chapter Three and the distinction between social harms and 
medical harms. Ensuring that your child expresses only socially ideal traits is morally problematic 
and risks reinforcing injustices in that society. Yet, ensuring that your child does not have a serious 
disease that would make your child’s life not worth living is intuitively permissible. If eugenics is 
simply manipulating the genetic make up of those we create in order to reduce harm to future 
persons, then, in a certain cases involving, say, prevention of disease, eugenics is not prima facie 
wrong. In order to decide whether certain practices that fall under the category of eugenics are 
wrong, we must assess whether our acts and omissions would lead to social harms, to medical 
harms, or to both; and we must figure out when and to what extent we are allowed to avoid risking 
social harms for the sake of combating injustice. The answers will depend on our roles.  
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If the harms and benefits at play are merely contingent on the present state of society, then 
the good news is that parents, doctors, leaders, and policymakers can work to change the state of 
society for the betterment of future children. However, this does not mean that this social change 
is the only imperative at work in any case of contingent social harm. Surely, the state of a society 
could be so unjustifiably harmful to future people with certain characteristics that, in addition to 
the imperative that we work to change the unjust conditions, it would also be impermissible to 
bring someone into existence who had those characteristics. Imagine a slave society whose 
privileged members enslaved all left-handed people and treated them extremely inhumanely. Of 
course, you would have good reason to work to combat the injustices of this society. But if you 
also knew you were going to conceive a left-handed child, the extreme state of this society would 
render the choice to conceive in this instance impermissible. In this case, you would have good 
reason to wait until you knew that conceiving this type of child would not entail such a gross 
assault on their basic rights.   
What are our responsibilities when the potential social harms are not so extreme? I take as 
a tool for this assessment a case involving preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or PGD, presented 
by Robert Sparrow. PGD allows doctors to determine to some extent the genetic profile of an 
embryo—and, notably, even of unfertilized eggs and sperm in some cases—and thereby to predict 
the likelihood of certain genetic characteristics or diseases. Doctors may then provide this 
information to prospective parents so that they can decide how best to fill the office of ‘their child.’ 
So, what de dicto responsibilities arise in cases where parents choose whether to have children 
with non-socially ideal characteristics? Sparrow argues that parents in this situation are warranted 
in focusing more on how to improve their child’s welfare regardless of what might be lowering 
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the child’s welfare.64 For the parent, what matters more is the level of welfare they can predict that 
their child will enjoy, and not the source of welfare. There is something to be said for this approach. 
If parents can predict that one choice will lead to lower welfare for their child and another will 
lead to higher welfare for their child, they have a pro tanto reason to opt for the latter in the interest 
of making things de dicto better for their child. However, I argue that these reasons can be 
overridden by other important moral factors, even in the face of de dicto responsibilities.65 
Sparrow considers a particular kind of PGD case involving intersex conditions. An intersex 
individual is someone born with ambiguous sex characteristics, which prevent that person from 
being identified as either distinctly male or distinctly female. These ambiguities may manifest 
internally (in the chromosomes or gonads) or externally (in the genitals). One of the most important 
benefits of PGD is its potential to raise the level of welfare of children born to parents who carry 
a genetic risk of medically harmful conditions, and intersex conditions can indeed lead to medical 
harms in the form of pain and limited functioning. When the risk in question involves a medical 
harm, and when PGD is able to minimize bodily harm or potential fatalities and maximize bodily 
functioning, then its use is intuitively permissible. However, some of the risks of harm resulting 
from intersex conditions are purely social in nature. Intersex individuals simply do not fit into our 
socially constructed, binary categories, and this could cause an intersex individual to suffer socially 
as a result. These largely social cases raise intriguing questions. Sparrow suggests that parents may 
forgo meeting a certain amount of social responsibility in the interest of their child’s welfare, 
because parents—in their roles as parents—have strong reason to consider preventing all low 
welfare in their children, even when the source of low welfare is injustice. In particular, Sparrow 
 
64 Sparrow 2013. 
65 Haramia 2013b. The following discussion is taken from my commentary in response to Sparrow (2013). 
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recognizes our aversion to practices that skirt the line of gender eugenics, but then points to several 
considerations that parents can appeal to as reasons in favor of PGD in merely socially harmful 
cases. While I agree that parents do have special obligations to their children by virtue of the role 
they have undertaken, and that parents are allowed certain considerations that, say, policymakers 
and researchers are not; I also challenge Sparrow’s claims about the extent to which such social 
welfare considerations justify the parental decision to use PGD in merely socially harmful cases, 
even when these decisions de dicto benefit their children.  
Again, one important feature of social welfare is that the harms and benefits at play are 
usually contingent on the present state of the society in question. If this is so, then parents (and 
others) have strong reason to adopt the goal of changing social conditions for the betterment of 
children’s welfare. But this is not always easy. Yet, discouraging the birth of intersex children as 
an alternative can exacerbate the injustice and harm of sex and gender stereotyping. While Sparrow 
admits that parents should not aim to be hostile to diversity, he appeals to parents’ lack of potency, 
to collective action problems, and to personal priorities as important factors in the justification of 
PGD use for cases that are merely socially risky (and not medically risky). I do not want to deny 
that parents’ responsibilities often allow them to overlook (to a certain degree) the difference 
between social harms and medical harms, and I agree that parents have some reason to create 
certain children with higher welfare over different children who would be less well off, insofar as 
they are able. This is of course due to their de dicto responsibilities that arise from their roles as 
parents. But the social problems outlined by Sparrow are not as insurmountable as presented, and 
this analysis will help to demonstrate why parents’ de dicto responsibilities are not restricted only 
to concerns about the level of their child’s welfare that can be achieved through reproductive 
decisions.  
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Sparrow claims that the social terrain for those with intersex conditions is importantly 
different from the terrain for others who suffer social harm as a result of certain characteristics. 
Intersex individuals are often less visible and can sometimes pass in their society without their 
condition being detected, whereas, say, a dark-skinned African-American is easily marked out as 
“different.” One thing Sparrow fails to recognize is that this lack of visibility could potentially 
diminish (some of) the harm from a socially hostile environment. Instead, he focuses on the claim 
that it is far more difficult for intersex individuals to form communities and generate benefits that 
counteract the harm and injustice of a socially hostile environment. So, Sparrow agrees that social 
conditions matter, but he also claims that parents should, at times, ignore eugenics concerns, given 
their unique responsibilities to their children. Importantly, he agrees that leaders, policymakers, 
doctors, and others would not be permitted to ignore those same eugenics concerns; and I would 
argue that this is due to the more social nature of their roles and the ways in which those roles 
differ from parental roles. Yet, Sparrow’s conclusion is too quick, and he fails to explore other 
facets of parental agency. For example, while parents may recognize that there are indeed fewer 
communities that tout intersex solidarity than, say, racial solidarity, they ought nonetheless to 
consider the imperative that such a realization implies. This is the imperative that parents work to 
create such communities for intersex individuals—sometimes instead of, and sometimes in 
addition to, making different reproductive choices. 
To accept the state of society—injustices and all—and to care only about (de dicto) 
increases in one’s child’s welfare is insufficient not only with respect to one’s responsibilities 
toward society, but also with respect to one’s responsibilities toward one’s child.  Consider as a 
parallel the plight of housewives in the 1950s and 1960s. Before Betty Friedan’s work, there was 
little solidarity among (admittedly, middle-to-upper-class white) women—similar to the lack of 
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solidarity that intersex individuals face today.66 And the low overall welfare that these housewives 
enjoyed was a purely social harm. There were no medical harms stemming from their being female, 
but they nonetheless had social worth only in their ability to run a home, and that work itself was 
unpaid and undervalued by society at large.  
Imagine now that these women were able to control the sex of their children at that time. 
Suppose that many decided to have only male children because they were worried about the low 
welfare that they had good reason to expect that their female children would experience. Would 
this be justified? It seems not, even though the mothers would have been primarily concerned with 
the welfare level of their children, and even though the mothers would have had good reason to 
think that their individual choices had little power to change their society from an unjust one to a 
just one. But, according to Sparrow, the a lack of community would have been good reason for 
these women to favor the eugenics of sex-selection in the interest of their role in promoting the 
welfare of their children. There were few groups or communities aimed at female solidarity at the 
time. These women were often severely isolated. And considering de dicto harm alone, parents 
ought to choose the option that avoids this harm. But, at least in the case of these housewives, a 
different strategy emerged, and that strategy is actually more consistent with parents’ role-based 
responsibilities. 
Women started forming consciousness-raising groups and created communities wherein 
they could find solidarity and discuss injustices.67 And, to some degree, it worked. Though my 
historical account is oversimplified, many women born to those housewives are not suffering the 
low welfare of their mothers and have at their disposal various groups and communities through 
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which they can find solidarity. While the parallel is not perfect here—females are usually visible 
as females in our society, and there are far more females than intersex individuals—an important 
lesson remains. An unjust social atmosphere and a lack of community can be challenged through 
the creation of groups that support the socially disadvantaged. While PGD and sex-selective IVF 
carry with them the risk of perpetuating social injustices, the creation of communities to support 
those with low social welfare directly combats those injustices and carries with it the potential to 
increase the welfare of those who suffer social injustices. Furthermore, even though the population 
of intersex individuals may be lower than those of other oppressed groups,68 parents and other 
concerned agents can strengthen those numbers by recruiting intersex allies who are willing to 
stand with intersex individuals, participate in these newly formed communities, and combat the 
social injustices related to these conditions. 
Sparrow rightly notes that suggesting that parents ought to make decisions based solely on 
societal concerns would be just as morally problematic as the gender eugenics underlying the 
alternative. However, parents need not restrict their role-based considerations to only their child’s 
welfare or only the likely effects of their childbirth choice on the social terrain. There is a better 
route for parents to take. This route involves a fair amount of work; it is no easy task to form 
groups where few exist and where social norms are entrenched. Therefore, I do not want to 
discount the Sparrow’s point that individual parents have individual choices to make and must 
consider their efficacy within society—as well as their time, energy, and financial capabilities, I 
would add. But intentionally bearing only socially ideal children can play right into the hands of 
the present injustices. The oppressed will often fare better if they can gain a voice, and the louder 
it is the better they may fare. But diminishing their numbers can correlate directly to how much 
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attention is paid to their cause, and childbirth choices can affect this. Of course, each given 
childbirth choice will have only a small effect, predictably, on the state of society or on the voice 
of the oppressed. This is why I agree that parents could, at times, have concerns that will outweigh 
the relevant justice concerns, especially in cases like the left-handed slave society mentioned 
above. How to weigh our responsibility over certain offices against our obligations to society at 
large is an important question. For my purposes, it is enough to point out that these social 
obligations still exist alongside our responsibilities as office caretakers, therefore minimizing de 
dicto harm is not necessarily the weightiest factor in a given creation case. When the harm is 
inherent to the condition, as it is in the Sarah case, de dicto responsibilities carry more weight. But 
when the harm is merely contingent on the state of society, the responsibility to better the office 
of those under your care carries less weight, and you have good reason under those circumstances 
to focus primarily on combating systematic injustices.  
Importantly, combating social injustice can benefit one’s children. But by successfully 
combating social injustice, we may not only benefit our own future children, we may improve the 
welfare of our species as a whole. In this way doctors, researchers, and policymakers have different 
responsibilities from those of parents. Parents have a more personal decision to make when it 
comes to their children’s welfare, but these others have responsibilities that are far more sweeping 
and social in nature, and thus their responsibilities to society and the species are stronger and more 
consistent than parents’. They should aim to improve our species’ welfare to the extent that they 
can, given their particular roles, even though the boundaries of our species (insofar as they can be 
outlined) are not what matter morally. Yet, this does not mean that the same considerations apply 
interspecies to all moral subjects, human or non-human; and we are allowed divergent de dicto 
considerations both among species and within our own species. Sandler writes,  
117 
 
[i]n some situations, factual differences between people can be a basis for 
differential treatment of them, even when they have the same moral status. For 
example, women, but not men, should receive prenatal health care. The same is true 
of factual differences between species. For example, humans and bottlenose 
dolphins might both be due compassion, but it does not follow that we should 
release people into the open sea and give dolphins polio vaccinations.69 
My view can account for these claims, because such prescriptions arise from our roles, and 
not directly from something like species membership or rational capacity. Recall that Kumar’s 
argument relied on contracts between parties who will possess some relevant sense of rational self-
governance. In effect, this restricted the scope of his view to only moral agents who have 
responsibility over other moral agents, because all those capable of rational self-governance are 
also moral agents. But to cover only one class of moral subjects is not only incomplete, it ignores 
some of the most compelling factors present in non-identity cases. As I stated earlier, Kumar’s 
view cannot account for the morality of actions in non-identity cases where persons below a certain 
level of mental functioning fill the office in question, because such individuals would not be 
capable of rational self-governance. In the same vein, his view cannot account for the morality of 
non-identity cases involving non-human animals. However, there are many important non-identity 
cases and responsibility relations involving moral agents and non-human animals. The two main 
categories I will explore are, broadly speaking, cases of companionship and cases of consumption. 
Humans intentionally create various species of animal to serve as either pet companions or food. 
But how do these creation cases connect with our role-based responsibilities to the animals? I will 
begin with an exploration of pet companion cases—specifically, breeding of pet companions. 
 
69 Sandler 2012: 162. 
118 
 
5.2 NON-HUMAN ANIMALS 
Breeding pedigreed pets often leads to severe health problems for dogs, cats, rabbits, and 
other pedigreed companion animals. These health problems can greatly inhibit normal functioning, 
such as mobility and breathing, and they often carry significant risk of shortened and painful lives. 
But what should we do with this knowledge? Many believe that this sort of selective breeding is 
morally wrong because it is harmful to our pets. Of course, the non-identity problem reveals a 
strong argument for the claim that many of these pets are not harmed. My view maintains that 
pedigreed breeding is in fact harmful—and that this harm can ground wrongness—but to arrive at 
that conclusion we must acknowledge not only de re harm but also, and more importantly, de dicto 
harm. I will focus here on dogs because pedigreed breeding of the species Canis lupus familiaris 
is far more widespread and commonly accepted than pedigreed breeding of other animals, though 
my argument applies to any species that could suffer due to our knowingly and willingly increasing 
the risk of health problems that result from a lack of genetic variation. I will focus also on 
pedigreed breeding because the reduction of genetic variation as a result of generations of 
inbreeding is a common effect of this practice.70 However, the reduction in genetic variation is 
what motivates moral concern here, not breeding per se. So, insofar as certain types of breeding 
do not increase the risk of health problems due to lack of genetic variation, my argument will not 
apply. And insofar as any non-pedigree-focused practices increase that risk, my argument will 
apply. Consider for a moment, Sadie, my family’s Golden Retriever. Sadie was adopted from a 
breeder as a puppy. She was well loved and well cared for. She lived into canine old age, and then 
she passed away. Sadie was a result of pedigreed breeding, but she was clearly not harmed by her 
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existence. But now one might think: what about the dogs who do encounter serious health problems 
as a result of their breeding? Suppose Sadie had been diagnosed with severe hip dysplasia resulting 
from her genetic makeup at age two and had to spend the rest of her life crippled and in significant 
pain.  
How should we approach cases wherein a dog has been intentionally bred with a lack of 
genetic variation due to breed standards and is now suffering from some drastic health problem as 
a direct result? If we rely on only the de re comparative account of harm, these dogs are often not 
harmed. Given that the health problem in question is inextricably tied to the animal’s genetic 
makeup, the particular animal could not exist without that problem. Therefore, if we aim to make 
a de re comparative claim of harm, we can only compare this animal’s existence to no life at all. 
And in that case, as long as that dog has a life worth living, then no particular health problem or 
defect constitutes a harm to that animal.  
This should give us pause, because even though there might be plenty of cases wherein the 
presence of certain health problems seems clearly preferable to no life at all, we should still resist 
the conclusion that it is perfectly acceptable to knowingly and willingly create animals who will 
suffer the negative effects of serious health problems—especially when we have the means to 
greatly reduce this health risk. And many people are intuitively resistant to this conclusion. When 
it is our job to care for those whose existence and welfare level are in our hands, the relevance of 
de dicto harm and responsibility arises, and distinct moral obligations emerge. 
These moral concerns apply to breeders, but they also apply to those simply selecting a 
dog. For, how frequently we choose breeders’ dogs determines how frequently they breed litters. 
Historically, we have bred dogs to be dependent on humans and to express traits that are non-
optimal to survival and flourishing—often mere aesthetic preferences or capabilities to meet 
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obsolete needs. This has led to the aforementioned diminished genetic variation within breeds and 
created significant health problems for our pets. Though the individual Golden Retriever or 
Dachshund might be a wonderful pet with a life worth living, this decent welfare cannot justify 
pedigreed dog breeding. The practice of pedigreed breeding in general fills the office of ‘our pets’ 
with many dogs who ultimately suffer from health problems that our pets would not have had 
given more cross-breeding and genetic variation. Not only did we create this dependent set of 
moral subjects, but we are also now aware of the negative effect that breeding has on pedigreed 
dogs in general. Therefore, we have a specific responsibility as pet caretakers to create pets who 
will be, on balance, healthier, and who will have higher welfare by ceasing the practice of 
pedigreed dog breeding—even though this means that certain perfectly happy dogs will never 
come into existence. 
Let us now turn to questions of de re versus de dicto harm surrounding the act of choosing 
or breeding a dog to become a pet.  This analysis will make clear the analogy between pet-specific 
non-identity cases and traditional procreative non-identity cases. 
First of all, it is important to note that, currently, any dog breeding harms many dogs in a 
strong de re sense. This is because too many dogs exist already—far more than can be adequately 
cared for. That is, there are more dogs now than there are offices of ‘my pet’ that dogs can fill. 
Thus, intentionally creating more dogs—pedigreed or otherwise—is, in most cases, tantamount to 
causing the premature death of as many shelter dogs as we create (because euthanasia is the most 
common solution to dog overpopulation). Anyone who wants to adopt a dog and who decides to 
fill the office of ‘my dog’ with a pet who was intentionally bred instead of a shelter pet is essentially 
allowing the death a dog somewhere. There is one exception, though it is still arguably morally 
problematic. If someone is only willing fill the office of ‘my dog’ with a pedigreed dog, then there 
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would be no potential for a shelter dog to fill this office. However, we can still question the moral 
integrity of someone who refuses to adopt a shelter dog, knowing the overpopulation problems 
that currently exist. Therefore, almost all dog breeding—pedigreed or otherwise—is de re harmful 
at this moment because it makes many actual, individual dogs worse off than they otherwise would 
have been. This is a straightforward sense of de re harm to dogs—and we ought to take it very 
seriously. However, de re harm does not arise in many other pet creation cases. 
Suppose we suddenly fixed the overpopulation problem. Now all the dogs who currently 
exist have homes, and all the dogs who will exist will have homes. Have we fulfilled our 
responsibility to these companion pets, morally speaking? We have not, I argue, if we are still 
allowing the breeding of pedigreed dogs, because pedigreed dogs are on balance less healthy and 
less well off than mixed breed dogs. Given medical and veterinary advancements, we are now able 
to recognize breed predispositions and patterns of inheritance. These predispositions and patterns 
lead to many troubling conditions borne by our pets. For example, progressive retinal atrophy 
(which causes blindness) is common in many dog breeds. Cardiomyopathy is common in Boxers. 
The long bodies and short, thick legs of Bassett Hounds, Dachshunds and Corgis are actually the 
result of abnormal development of cartilage. Painful disk herniation occurs for many members of 
these breeds at a fairly young age. Hip Dysplasia is common in Golden Retrievers, Rottweilers, 
and many large breed dogs. English Bull Dogs, Pugs, Boston Terriers, Pekingese, Cavalier King 
Charles Spaniels, Shar-peis, French Bulldogs, Lhasa Apsos, and Shih Tzus can all suffer from 
Brachycephalic Syndrome. This ailment is a direct result of breeding and human intervention 
because our selecting for the exaggerated facial features representative of these breeds has resulted 
in serious respiratory difficulties for members of these breeds. For example, breed standards for 
the English Bulldog specify that the face should be very short, as should the distance between the 
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tip of the nose and where it is set deep between the eyes. It is not surprising, then, that this leaves 
little room for the functions involved in normal breathing. These are just some of the many 
problems our pedigreed pets face as a result of lack of genetic variation and of genetic patterns of 
inheritance.71  
Most of these problems, however, are not so severe that the dogs who suffer from them 
have lives that are worse than no existence at all. Many of our pedigreed dogs have lives that are 
overall worth living, and they would not exist at all without such predispositions because, in that 
case, the dogs in question would be mixed breed dogs with utterly distinct genes and parentage. 
However, even though many pedigreed dogs are not de re harmed, we should not be tempted to 
find the practice of pedigreed dog breeding thereby morally acceptable. We must still consider the 
de dicto harm to our dogs and our related responsibilities. Just as Sarah harms her child in a de 
dicto sense by making it the case that whoever comes to be her child is far worse off than her child 
otherwise could have been, so too do we harm our pets when we knowingly create dogs who will 
be far worse off than our dogs otherwise could have been. Of course, some pedigreed dogs do not 
exhibit these harmful traits at all and do not suffer from their genetic status. However, there is still 
a very high risk that any given pedigree dog will indeed be one who suffers from a breed 
predisposition, and we would probably not find Sarah’s actions any more acceptable if she had 
made it the case that there was a high risk (instead of a guarantee) of having a child with a serious 
birth defect when she could have had a healthy child. The responsibility criterion obtains when we 
stand in a responsibility relation to the office that moral subjects are filling or will come to fill. To 
fulfill one’s role as an office caretaker, one must take de dicto harm seriously. With this in mind, 
let us assess our role as caretakers for the office of ‘our pets.’ 
 
71 These examples of predisposition and patterns of inheritance can be found in Dobson 2013; Gough & Thomas 2010. 
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I hold that companion pets are moral subjects. That is, I assume that it matters morally how 
we treat them. So, what kinds of moral responsibility do we have to our dogs? I claim that two 
kinds of responsibility-relations obtain—the first is a general responsibility and the other a more 
specific responsibility. Because humans themselves created the dependency on humans that canine 
pets now have, we are clearly responsible for the fact that they require our care. Thus, insofar as 
we are members of the human race, we have a general responsibility to all dogs everywhere, and 
to whoever these dogs turn out to be. We also have more specific responsibilities to our individual 
pets, and each person who accepts the role of a caretaker for the office of ‘my pet’ thereby incurs 
specific responsibilities. These responsibilities include avoiding both de re harm and, importantly, 
de dicto harm. We have strong obligations to care for our specific dogs, but we also have strong 
moral reason to avoid certain de dicto harms and to cease pedigreed dog breeding insofar as it 
leads to significantly lower welfare. 
For those who take this argument to heart, there are two things to keep in mind. The first 
is that the bulk of these welfare concerns stem from a lack of genetic variation. Since the vast 
majority of breeding leads to precisely this state, I do wish to critique the practice of breeding as 
it currently stands. However, this does not rule out the possibility that reforming breed standards 
or practicing breeding such that we ultimately increase the general fitness of our pets could 
appropriately address these welfare-related concerns. In fact, further analysis might reveal that we 
are morally required to breed our pets to be as healthy as possible, if our medical and breeding 
capabilities surpass nature’s ability to produce healthy animals. Second, it is important to keep in 
mind that these concerns do not apply to currently existing pedigreed pets who have lives worth 
living. The de re benefits of love and care and good welfare that these pets enjoy matter precisely 
because these pets already exist.   I do not claim that anyone’s beloved pedigreed pet should not 
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exist. However, I do claim we should think carefully about how to improve the welfare of the 
animals we ultimately bring into existence, and we should take seriously our de dicto 
responsibilities to those future animals. 
The above assumes that these species-specific offices should exist at all, which is fairly 
uncontroversial with companion pets; but what about the animals we raise for food? The vast 
majority of cows, pigs, and fowl would not exist if we did not raise them for consumption. Factory 
farming is clearly morally abhorrent because the animals have lives well below the level that makes 
them worth living, and the de re comparative account of harm easily generates wrongs in these 
cases. But without a successful solution to the non-identity problem, it is hard to justify the claim 
that we ought to do any more than make farm animals’ lives barely worth living. Given the likely 
features of a farm animal’s barely-worth-living life, this conclusion is sure to be as counterintuitive 
as in the other non-identity problem cases.  
The two most popular approaches to consumption animal ethics are the consequentialist 
approach and the rights-based approach. The consequentialist has an easy answer to questions of 
wrongness in animal farming cases—just as they have an easy answer to the non-identity 
problem—however, given the independent problems with this view referenced in the section on 
impersonal approaches, and given the prevalence of animal rights advocates, I turn to the unique 
shortcomings of the rights-based approach in animal creation cases. Again, this appears to be the 
sort of problem that a traditional rights-based view is fundamentally ill-equipped to handle. For 
Tom Regan, rights inhere in experiencing subjects of lives.72 Yet, even granting that individual 
animals have rights, the animals who would have better lives do not exist in the scenario where 
the lives of farm animals are barely worth living, so we cannot say that those non-existent animals 
 
72 Regan 1983. 
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are experiencing subjects of lives whose rights have been violated. Similarly, we will have trouble 
talking about our obligations to farm animals qua species, given that species are not the sorts of 
things with rights either. Yet our actions clearly affect these animals at the species level, too. But 
as we saw above, a role-based view easily explains why we should aim for lives well above the 
threshold of barely-worth-living when we create animals, and it helps to uncover what we owe to 
these animals at the species level.  
I will focus on an analysis of the potential responsibility relations between farmers/ranchers 
(hereafter ‘farmers’ for simplicity’s sake) and those animals raised for consumption, though it 
should be noted that many others affect these animals indirectly with their choices as consumers, 
policymakers, etc. The farmers, however, are directly involved in the creation of animals, and their 
actions do predictably affect the welfare and identity of the animals under their care.  
First of all, these farmed animals either qualify as moral subjects, or they do not. If, on the 
one hand, they do qualify—as many have argued they do—then we seem to have a clear case of 
de dicto responsibility on the part of the farmers. While the exact parameters of this role and the 
resultant responsibilities are debatable, it seems obvious that as office caretakers farmers ought at 
least to ensure that the animals who fill those offices have lives that are better than barely-worth-
living. One could argue that they have this responsibility just by virtue of their occupying the role 
of farmers, but there is further support for this responsibility that parallels aspects of the pedigreed 
breeding cases. Animals raised for consumption exist in the numbers that they do and with the 
genetic makeup that they have because we have historically bred them in this manner. As with 
companion pets, we created these dependent sets of moral subjects with their unique 
characteristics, and this history grounds our responsibility to avoid committing de dicto harms 
when determining how these offices are filled. Of course, it is a further moral question to ask 
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whether it is permissible to kill and eat animals whose welfare meets or exceeds the threshold 
determined by the role of farmer. The answer will likely depend to some degree on whether those 
existing animals have a right to life, but that is beyond the scope of this work, and thus not a 
question I will attempt to settle here. However, it should be noted that the truth of the conclusion 
that it is impermissible to kill and eat animals leads to a proscription on raising them for food. If 
we ceased this practice, we would then need to ask whether we have a responsibility to continue 
creating these animals and providing them with high welfare, or whether we are allowed to permit 
entire species to wither away after we cease creating them for food. The answer will hinge on what 
we owe to species whose members possess moral worth, but, as with the eugenics cases, we must 
consider other broader and morally relevant effects of, say, using arable land for the cultivation 
and maintenance of certain species, and how this might compete with our other responsibilities. 
Determining our role-specific responsibilities relies on a number of factors. Determining 
that we have role-specific responsibilities relies on arguments for de dicto harm and benefit and 
the recognition of the two-place responsibility relation between agents and offices that are filled 
by moral subjects. These features uncover a theoretically useful account of responsibility that, 
when applied to many practical cases, grounds our intuitions of harm and benefit, and provides a 
principled approach through which we can assess our obligations to both consumption and 
companion animals. 
5.4 CONCLUSION: FINDING RESPONSIBILITY, FOUNDING HARM 
My approach relies on the principles that agents can commit de dicto harms, and that the 
responsibility criterion is necessary—albeit sometimes not sufficient—for generating the 
wrongness of de dicto harm. The responsibility criterion is necessary because cases of de dicto 
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harm that do not contain a responsibility-relation do contain intuitively permissible de dicto harms. 
In fact, it appears that the lack of responsibility is precisely what generates the intuitions of 
permissibility. However, this criterion is not always sufficient to generate the wrongness of de 
dicto harm because some responsibility-relations involve roles that generate competing 
considerations that may defeat the reasons against de dicto harm in those cases. Thus, we may find 
that Sarah acts wrongly, but we must not conclude that all mothers who choose to commit de dicto 
harm act wrongly in parental cases. We can, however, debate the morality of a given mother’s act 
in terms of her de dicto responsibility, and this is an important debate. It allows us to consider not 
only de dicto responsibility but also broader concerns regarding social justice, personal sacrifice, 
de re responsibility, and the like. Thus, my solution is useful not because I have proposed a 
principle that delineates precisely when a given act of creation is wrong, but because the feature 
of non-identity cases that generated the problem was our supposed inability to appeal to the 
comparative account of harm when assessing wrongness; and my view allows for an appeal to the 
comparative account of harm. Just as de re harm is not always impermissible, neither is de dicto 
harm always impermissible. To determine the permissibility or impermissibility of these harms, 
we must look at the cases themselves. I have provided a means of determining harm and thereby 
opened the door for an analysis of that harm. The real problem with non-identity cases was not 
simply that we could not tell Sarah that she has done something wrong. It was that we were blocked 
from even analyzing the case properly in the first place. I have uncovered a means by which we 
can usefully analyze creation cases, but its use does not end there. If these principles are true, they 
not only provide us with a sound approach to the non-identity problem, they also provide us with 
moral features to which we can appeal whenever we assess our roles and moral responsibilities to 
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children, future generations, society, species, and to the human race, regardless of the particulars 
of existence. 
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